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ITALY'S PART 

IN THE WAR 



by W. K. MCCLURE 



VITH ILLUSTRATIONS 



BEMPORAD 

PUBLISHERS 

FLORENCE 



W. K. MCCLURE 



ITALY'S PART 

IN THE WAR 



WITH ILLUSTRATIONS 



R. BEMPORAD & SON 
PUBLISHERS - FLORENCE 






ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, 

COPYRIGHT BY 

R. BEMPORAD & SON - FLORENCE 



Florence - Printed at the Tipografia Giuntina. directed by L. Franceschini. 



wLmmis^c^Mjmrmm:rm 




PREFACE 



HIS book is an attempt to remove 
some of the misunderstandings 
which have prevented full re- 
cognition of Italy's part in the war. I 
have tried very briefly to reply to most 
of the criticisms which I have heard so 
often during the last four years ; and I 
have added certain explanations which 
seem to help the general aim. 

Rome, 1918. 



Victor Emanuel, King of Italy. 




RE D* ITALIA 



m. mm m m^WM ^imL ms^m 



Chapter L 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 




N order to understand Italy's part in 
the European war it is necessary to 
go back more than forty years, to the 
events which led up to the Triple Alliance. 

The Kingdom of Italy, as it exists to-day, 
had been formed in successive stages with the 
help first of France and then of Prussia ; and 
throughout the long struggle for unity Italians had 
always been able to rely upon the moral and 
political support of Great Britain. When Italy 
finally took her place among the great nations of 
Europe her leaders endeavoured to pursue a policy 
of equal friendship with all the Powers, but it 
soon became evident that her interests could not 
be defended by this policy. Italy could not stand 
alone in the conflict of ambitions. 

Two Powers seemed to threaten her newly 
won position — Austria and France. Austria was 
the traditional enemy, still looking with a revengeful 
eye upon the Italian provinces which had been 



- 6 - 

freed from the Habsburg yoke by the wars of 1 859 
and 1 866. A large number of Italians, moreover, 
still remained under Austrian rule, and this formed 
a problem which seemed to mark the two Powers 
as natural enemies. France had helped Piedmont 
to drive the Austrians from Lombardy, but she 
had supported the Pope and opposed the Italian 
occupation of Rome, which had been delayed 
until her hands were tied by the war of 1870. 

Austrian hostility seemed the greater danger, 
and every effort was made by successive Italian 
governments to maintain good relations with France. 
There was friction between the two " Latin 
sisters " during the " seventies ", but matters did 
not come to a head until 1881, when the French 
occupation of Tunisia dealt a severe blow to 
Italian hopes. Tunisia had come to be regarded 
in Italy, by those at least who devoted attention 
to such questions, as a legitimate sphere of Italian 
interest. More than 50,000 Italians had setded 
in the country, their number far exceeded that of 
the French colony, and Italy's claim to the 
eventual declaration of a protectorate certainly 
seemed stronger than that of France, which was 
based upon the necessity, real or imagined, of 
protecting the Algerian frontier from disturbance 
by unruly neighbours. 

The feeling in Italy caused by the action of 



clearly offered the best guarantee against the dan- 
gers which threatened. It gave support against 
France. It removed the risk oi an attack from 
Austria. The argument was already old that 
Austria and Italy could only be enemies or allies 
— there was no half-way house between the two 
conditions. National sentiment was all against an 
alliance with Austria. Apart from old memories of 
cruel oppression, the alliance meant a sacrifice of 
the hope of completing national unity by the acqui- 
sition of the Italian lands still under Austrian rule. 
But the alliance between Germany and Austria, 
and the unfriendly attitude of France, had made 
this hope recede very far. Italy could not af- 
ford to indulge her national sentiment. She had 
to consider her national security. Negotiations 
were attempted with Germany, but Bismarck in- 
dicated that an agreement must first be reached 
with Austria. After some difficukies this agree- 
ment was concluded, and in May 1 882 the Dual 
• Alliance between Germany and Austria- Hungary 
was converted into the Triple Alliance by the 
adhesion of Italy, but Germany and Austria de- 
clined to support Italy in the Mediterranean. Six 
years later the Mediterranean agreement advoca- 
ted by Baron Sonnino was negotiated with Great 
Britain. This understanding was reached wath 
the full approval of Bism.arck, who no doubt saw 



— lo- 
in it a help to his policy of keeping Great Bri- 
tain and France apart. 

Until the early years of this century the Triple 
Alliance certainly made for peace. As far as 
Italy was concerned it was essentially a defensive 
alliance, made and maintained for any but ag- 
gressive reasons. It had an additional advantage 
beyond that of giving protection from the tv^o 
immediate dangers which had threatened Italian 
interests. The security which it gave enabled 
Italy to speak with France on equal terms — a 
necessary preliminary to the establishment of cor- 
dial relations between the two Powers. These 
good relations were long in coming, but patience 
and a recognition of common interest at length 
prevailed. A commercial treaty signed in 1898 
put an end to a tariff war which had continued 
for ten years, and two subsequent agreements, in 
1900 and 1902, removed the danger of collision 
between France and Italy in North Africa. 

The years which followed showed that the« 
Triple Alliance did not give a satisfactory gua- 
rantee of Italian interests. Although the Alliance 
had made a truce between Italy and Austria, 
relations between the two Powers never became 
cordial. The main obstacle lay in the problem 
of the Italians who still remained under Austrian 
rule. Liberal treatment might have killed the 



- n — 

movement in favour of uniting the Italian lands 
of Austria to the Italian Kingdom, but the Aus- 
trian Government was incapable of liberal treat- 
ment. The wound was kept open by continual 
petty persecution of the Italians in the " unre- 
deemed " provinces, and by the encouragement 
of the Slav elements against the Italian. Aus- 
tria still believed she could rule by dividing. 
Another difficulty was the " clericalism " of Aus- 
tria. The relations between the Papacy and 
the Italian Government had greatly improved, but 
there was still opportunity for those who wished 
to stir up trouble, and Austria threatened to take 
the place of France as a maker of mischief. A 
third point was the growing divergence of Aus- 
trian and Italian interests and aims in the Balkans. 

The Triple Alliance stipulated that Italy and 
Austria should work hand in hand in the Bal- 
kans. Both Powers had declared that it was 
their object to avoid " territorial changes ", but 
Austria's general policy and various definite acts 
(notably the annexation of Bosnia and Herzego- 
vina in 1908) ignored these engagements. Italy 
and Austria appeared more and more clearly as 
rivals rather than allies. 

The Triple Alliance, in fact, was changing 
in character. Germany and Austria v/ere deve- 
loping a policy which was to convert it from a 



- 12 — 

bulwark of defence to an instrument for aggres- 
sion. Germany was bent upon " world-power " ; 
Austria was cherishing and renewing ambitions in 
the Near East, and did not realize to what extent 
she was falling under the influence of her more 
powerful ally, haly's position in the alliance was 
becoming more and more difficult. She had been 
compelled to sacrifice sentiment to interest and now 
she saw that her interests were in danger. It was 
altogether to Italy's disadvantage that Austria should 
extend her influence m the Balkans. But the real 
difference lay deeper : Italy's chief interest was 
peace, and her Allies were working towards war. 
When the Triple Alliance was renewed for 
the fourth and last time, in December 1912, 
Europe was inevitably moving towards the great 
catastrophe. But Italy's adhesion to the alliance 
did not mean her identification with the policy 
of her Allies. The terms of the alliance did 
not bind her to make common cause with them 
in aggressive action, and in fact, during the twenty 
months which passed between the renewal of the 
alliance and the outbreak of the European struggle, 
Italy was almost continually engaged in fighting 
the tendencies which finally led to war. Austria, 
backed by Germany, was determined to increase 
her power in the Balkans. Italy strove to check 
this movement, and did succeed in delaying it. 



— 13 — 

The triumph of the Balkan allies in the war 
against Turkey was a severe blow to German and 
Austrian hopes ; for the alliance of the Balkan 
States threatened to block the way to the East. 
As soon as it became evident that the results of 
the war would enlarge and strengthen Serbia, 
Austria proposed that Serbia's increase of terri- 
tory should be subject to certain guarantees. 
Italy's consent to this programme was asked, and 
was given on condition that these guarantees 
" should not constitute a monopoly, to the exclu- 
sive profit of Austria- Hungary, and should not 
diminish the independence of Serbia ^. Austria 
did not press the matter any further, perhaps, as 
Signor Tittoni ( 1 ) suggested later, " because she was 
gradually preparing and substituting for this pacific 
plan the plan of aggression ^'. In any event, the 
" pacific plan " was spoiled by the conditions upon 
which Italy insisted. 

Both Germany and Austria were bent upon 
destroying the Balkan League and undoing the 
results of its victory, and the unhappy jealousies 
between the Balkan States made the task easy. 
But even before the break came, while the Pow- 
ers were discussing whether Montenegro should 
be allowed to retain Scutari, Austria was pre- 



(1) At that time Italian Ambassador in Paris. 



~~ 14 — 

pared to back diplomacy by military action ^ In 
April 1913 she threatened to attack Montenegro. 
Germany supported the threat, if she did not in- 
spire it. Italy's reply was that if A^ustrian troops 
attacked Montenegro she would disembark an 
expedition on the Albanian coast. She based her 
proposed action on Article Seven of the Triple 
Alliance, which provided that neither Italy nor 
Austria should disturb the situation in the Bal- 
kans " by a temporary or permanent occupation ^ 
of territory without the consent of the other, and 
without adequate compensation, previously agreed 
upon. Signor Tittoni, Vv^hose advice was asked 
by the Italian Foreign Minister, the late Marchese 
di San Giuliano, was very emphatic in his expres- 
sion of opinion. He not only insisted on the 
rights of Italy under Article Seven. He wrote 
that " the day on which Austria should claim to 
upset, in any way or to any extent, the equili- 
brium in the Adriatic, the Triple Alliance would 
have ceased to exist ". 

Austria refrained from military action, but 
continued her mischievous diplomacy, in close 
co-operation with Germany. The Balkan League 
broke up, but the second Balkan war led to a 
result very different from that upon which Ger- 
many and Austria had calculated. Bulgaria was 
defeated in a few weeks. Serbia gained much, 



— 15 — 

both in territory and prestige. The fact was in- 
tolerable to Austria-Hungary, and on the day be- 
fore the Treaty of Bukarest was signed by the 
Balkan Powers she proposed that Italy should 
consent to her attacking Serbia. Italy refused to 
consider the shameful proposal, and her Allies 
were not yet prepared to act without her agree- 
ment. It was evident, hov/ever, that the thrust 
against Serbia was only delayed until a more fa- 
vourable moment — that the Triple Alliance, 
therefore, stood on a shaking foundation. 



19 



she warned them that her neutrality was only 
provisional. No time was lost in making the 
first point clear to the world. On August 4 the 
Italian Government published a declaration of 
neutrality, pointing out that the conditions which 
would have compelled Italy to take up arms with 
Germany and Austria had not been fulfilled. 
The importance of this declaration was great. 
Until it was known that Italy would not join her 
Allies, France had to provide against an attack 
upon her south-eastern frontier, and France and 
England had to face the possibility of a dangerous 
situation in the Mediterranean. The joint fleets 
of Austria and Italy, strengthened by the German 
cruisers Goeben and Breslau, would have given 
much anxiety. Italy's prompt declaration of 
neutrality swept away these preoccupations. The 
Austrian fleet was penned in the Adriatic, and 
the Goeben and the Breslaa ran for Constantinople. 
The waters of the Mediterranean remained free 
for France and England, free for the passage of 
troops and merchandise. Still more important was 
the fact that France could leave the Italian 
frontier unguarded, and use all her stength to 
meet the German onslaught. If Italy had joined 
the Powers who were then her Allies, or if she 
had played a waiting game, France could not 
have concentrated her forces. Without this 



20 



concentration the resistance on the Marne could 
hardly have prevailed, and the Germans might 
have made their triumphant entry into Paris. 

Public opinion in France and England has 
never quite realized the importance of Italy's 
decision. This failure is to Italy's honour. It 
shows the estimate in which she was held by the 
countries who are now her allies. The ordinary 
Englishman or Frenchman scarcely glanced at the 
possibility of Italy joining in the great crime. He 
took it for granted that she would hold aloof. 
Before long, indeed, people began to show 
impatience because Italy did not immediately make 
common cause with the Entente. The immense 
advantage to the Entente of Italy's declaration of 
neutrality was largely ignored or forgotten. The 
difficulties of her position were only realized by 
a few. 

It is clearly unjust that the value, moral and 
material, of Italy's decision should be ignored be- 
cause that decision appeared to most people in- 
evitable, because it seemed unthinkable that Italy 
should be false to her own best traditions. We 
are rightly proud that we did not tolerate the 
German invasion of Belgium, and we know the 
effect of our intervention. Yet it would have been 
easier, more " justifiable ", for Italy to follow her 
allies to war than for England to remain aloof 




THE CROWN PRINCE OF ITALY IN BOY-SCOUT*S UNIFORM. 



- 21 — 

from her friends. Italy had only to adopt the 
argument of her alHes and of many British paci- 
fists, and ailei^e that Germany and Austria were 
driven to make v/ar in self-defence, hemmed in 
as they were hy a rjnL^ of fiostile nations. [Res- 
ting on such an argument Italy could fjave in- 
voked Clause IV of the Triple Alliance : 

" In case a Great Power not signatory of 
" the present Treaty should tlireaten tlte State 
" security of one of the hi{/h contracting parties, 
" and in case the threatened parry should thereby 
" be compelled to declare war against that Great 
" Power, the two other contracting parties engage 
" themselves to maintain benevolent neutrality to- 
" wards their ally. Each of them reserves its right, 
" in this case, to take part jn tfie war if it thinks 
fjt in order to make common cause y/ith its 
" ally \ 

For Italy the argument was impossible. The 
use of it involved either ignorance or dishonesty, 
and the men wfio governed the country were 
neither ignorant nor dishonest. They knev/ tfje 
facts, faced them and acted on tfiern. Italy's al- 
titude during the cnfical days and [jcr eventual 
declaration of neutrality were in effect as definite 
a condemnation of German and Austrian action 
as Great Britain*s declaration of war. 

This condemnation was fully approved by the 

2 



22 



vast majority of Italians. Even at this early date, 
before all the facts were exposed in their nak- 
edness, the instinct and good sense of the Italian 
people did not err. They pointed straight to those 
who were guilty of the war. The declaration 
of neutrality came as an immense relief. It must 
he remembered that the provisions of the Triple 
Alliance were secret, that the obligations which 
it involved were not generally known. Many 
people had believed that the terms of the Al- 
liance might demand Italian intervention on the 
side of Germany and Austria. It was mainly for 
this reason, though partly from a genuine admira- 
tion for German efficiency, that the small Nationa- 
list party at first raised its voice in favour of march- 
ing with the Allies of thirty years' standing; 
others, though they did not express the feeling, 
leaned the same way. After the declaration 
of neutrality, with its explicit statement that the 
terms of the Alliance did not oblige Italy to 
intervene, the question fell to the ground. The 
general conscience of Italy gave hearty approval 
to the decision of the Government. 

It should never be forgotten that Italy had 
a choice. The other Great Powers, practically 
speaking, had none. Once the strings were 
pulled at Berlin, and Austria jerked her puppet 
limbs across the Danube, only a wilful blindness 



to honour and interest alike could have led to 
any different action, on the part of Russia, 
France or England, from that which these Powers 
actually took. Italy had a choice. Two things 
determined her decision : first, the fact that nei- 
ther Government nor country could join hands 
with Germany and Austria ; second, the convic- 
tion which dawned in the minds of a few that 
now was the time to complete Italian unity. 

So far it has been possible to speak generally 
of Italy, without drawing any sharp distinction 
between Government and people. Practically the 
whole force of the country was behind the de- 
claration of neutrality. All Italy disavowed the 
action of her Allies. The first choice was as 
nearly unanimous as any national decision can be ; 
but before very long it became evident that the 
road along which it led divided in two. A second 
choice had to be faced, and Government and 
people approached the crossroad in a different 
spirit. The Government was moving within the 
hampering limits of a written treaty ; public opin- 
ion, ignorant of the terms of the treaty, argued 
upon broad lines. 

It has been seen that early in the desperate 
week which preceded the war Italy raised the 
question of the Italian lands under Austrian rule, 
and indicated that she would look here for com- 



- 24 - 

pensation under the terms of the Alliance. From 
that position the Italian Government never receded. 
If Austria would not meet Italian demands in re- 
gard to the " unredeemed ^' provinces, the Triple 
Alliance vv^ould be at an end, and Italy would be 
free to act as interest and inclination should dictate. 

In the first rush and swirl of the war the 
diplomats had to stand aside. Germany and 
Austria were confident of early victory, and had 
no mind to discuss the claim of their Ally. The 
terms of the treaty did not weigh with them 
at all. They believed that Italy could be ignored, 
and that was enough to justify to them the break- 
ing of a pledged word. They knew that Italy 
was in no way prepared for war. The Giolitti 
Government, which had gone out of office a 
few months before, had left the Army in a de- 
plorable condition as regards munitions and equip- 
ment. Germany and Austria believed that the 
war would be over before Italy could he ready 
to back her demands by force, the only argument 
they appreciated. 

The reaffirmation of the attitude taken up by 
the Italian Government at the end of July was 
delayed owing to the illness and death (October 
'16) of the Italian Foreign Minister, San Giulia- 
no. Before his last illness came upon him San 
Giuliano had in preparation a Note which was 



— 25 — 

to put the Italian case in detail, and repeat the 
warning given in July. There was a short inter- 
val before Baron Sonnino could be induced to 
accept the post of Foreign Minister ; some time 
was necessary before he could master the details 
of the position and decide upon his course of 
action ; it was not until December 9 that he 
stated the Italian case in a formal Note to Vien- 
na. The Note went straight to the point : " The 
" actual military advance of Austria- Hungary in 
" Serbia constitutes a fact which must be an object 
" of examination by the Italian and Austro-Hungarian 
" Governments on the basis of the stipulations 
" contained in Article VII of the Triple Alliance. 
" From this article derives the obligation of the 
" Austro-Hungarian Government, even in the case 
" of temporary occupations, to come to a previous 
" agreement with Italy and to arrange for com- 
'^ pensations. The Imperial and Royal Govern- 
" ment ought, therefore, to have approached us 
" and come to an agreement with us before send- 
" ing its troops across the Serbian frontier ". 

It is unnecessary to follow in detail the long 
course cf the conversations between Italy, Austria 
and Germany, which went on from December 
1914 till April 1915. Austria quibbled and 
fenced. Count Berchtold first, and then his suc- 
cessor Baron Burian, twisted and turned and 



— 26 — 

sought to evade the obligations of the Treaty of 
Alliance. The Austrian arguments were remark- 
able. They were chiefly devoted to a demon- 
stration of the inconvenience which would be 
caused by carrying out the terms of the Alliance. 
The fact that a pledged word was involved did 
not hamper them at all. The solemn engage- 
ments of a treaty signed and re-signed meant as 
little to Austria now as they had mattered to 
Germany in the case of Belgium. !n both cases 
the one mainspring of argument, as of conduct, 
was expediency. 

Austria argued that it would not be expedi- 
ent to fulfil her obligations under Article Seven. 
Germany, more far-sighted though equally lacking 
in any sense of honour, realized that Italy meant 
business, and that it might be advisable to pay 
due regard to the Treaty of Alliance, in seeming 
at least. Prince von Biilow, who replaced Herr 
von Flotow at Rome, towards the end of 1 9 1 4, set 
about to play the part of the honest broker. He 
Y/orked very hard to clear the ground of the prelim- 
inary difficulties, and after more than three months' 
discussion Austria was finally induced to make an 
offer of " compensation ". The offer was ridiculously 
inadequate, and Baron Sonnino's counter-proposals 
showed what a gulf separated the Italian and 
Austrian points of view. Italy, or the man who 



spoke tor her. was deteraiined to settle the pro- 
blem of the " unredeemed ^ lands, to \\Tn the 
frontiers to which she was entitled, and to protect 
her interests under the terms or the Alliance. 
Austria quite failed to understand this determina- 
tion. In lact, she mistook the whole positicn. 
Her manner of vie^sing treat}' obligations preverit- 
ed her rrom realizinc: that Italv vras not selling 
her neutrality, but was making a claim under a 
solemn agreement. Austria looked upon Italy's 
neutrality as a negotiable article, and was pre- 
pared to offer for it what she considered a rea- 
sonable price. She did not realize the force of 
Italy's national aspirations, and in any event she 
was determined to keep a rrontier that should 
maintain her militar}- advantage over Italy. This 
was the more necessar}' ai s.'-.e h=i t,z :r.tt't:on 
Oi abiding by any agreemeL: ''T.:::. r;.:;:.: be 
reached. Her whole attitude maie :::i clear 
enough, and the last doubt was removed later, 
when Count 1 isza declared op^nlv that the ne- 
gotiations w::-. ':?'-• r.s.d onlv been undertaken 



in order to 



When :; zt:i:::.~ evident that the Triple 
Alliance was pracrically at an end. Ea:::. 5:n- 
nino turned ro tr.e i ::i.e Entente. Itaiy's A'.ies 
had broken the letter as '■rt.. as :t si:::: :r the 
Alliance when tLey went to war %MtriOUt con- 



— 28 — 

suiting her. But the policy of over thirty years 
could hardly be abandoned in a day. It was 
only natural that San Giuliano should refrain 
from seizing the first chance of breaking loose 
from the Alliance, although he entered a formal 
protest and gave a solemn warning. It must al- 
ways be remembered that at that date very few 
people realized the aims or methods of Germany 
and Austria, and what they stood for in the 
world. When Baron Sonnino came to the For- 
eign Office he found the lines of policy traced 
by his predecessor. There seemed no valid rea- 
son to depart from them. He was bound, not 
only by the tradition of thirty years, but by a 
recent declaration which appealed to the Treaty 
of Alliance. 

In the end it became evident that the inter- 
ests of Italy could not be secured by the continu- 
ance of even the formal alliance with Germany 
and Austria. And Austria's failure, her second 
failure, to pay due regard to the terms of the 
Alliance, gave back to Italy her freedom of act- 
ion. San Giuliano*s warning was fulfilled. The 
Triple Alliance was '' irrevocably broken ". Baron 
Sonnino speedily negotiated an agreement with 
the Entente Powers, an agreement which pro- 
mised to Italy her " unredeemed " provinces, a 
satisfactory military frontier, and certain regions on 






'S'^^T^- -^mUhi: 





Gabriele D'Annunzio delivering his commemoration of the " Thousand " 
on the cHff of Quarto near Genoa. 




Gabriele D'Annunzio the Poet Soldier. 



~ 29 — 

the east coast of the Adriatic the possession of 
which would redress her very unfavourable naval 
position vis-a-vis to Austria. This agreement 
pledged Italy to declare war upon Austria within 
a month, and to consider herself from that date 
to be at war with the enem.ies of her new 
Allies (]). 

By a slow and difficult path, hampered by 
long tradition, beset with many uncertainties, the 
men who guided haly's destinies came to the 
brink of war against their former Allies. They 
chose war deliberately. They took upon themselves 
the immense responsibility, for they realized 
that only force of arms could secure Italian 
unity, and they held that only force of arms 
could make safe the future of a greater Italy. 
And at the end they recognized, what had 
not been so clear during the first bewildering 
months, that the war was far more than a poli- 
tical and military struggle, that it was in reality 
a conflict between two moralities, a conflict from 
which Italy could not stand aloof. Their vision 
saw beyond the immediate ambitions, and perhaps 
it was what they saw there that gave them cour- 
age to assume the burden of war. 



(1) For a further discussion of the London 
Agreement see Chapter V. 



30 



The men who took the formal decision for 
Italy did not omit to weigh the chances, to work 
out plans, to ensure safeguards and provide for 
the future. That was the clear duty of men 
placed as they were, and it is strange to find 
brought against them sometimes the charge that 
they were slow to decide, that they showed a 
calculating spirit. Surely they could do no less. 
There was no previous obligation, as in the case 
of the other Great Powers of Europe, to hurry 
into war. It was right that Italy's leaders should 
come step by step, in cold blood, to the tre- 
mendous choice. 

While the declaration of neutrality had the 
whole people behind it, there was no such una- 
nimity during the months which followed. Public 
opinion was in the dark regarding the further 
provisions of the Triple Alliance. All that was 
known for certain was the fact that there had 
been no obligation for Italy to join her Allies, 
but between holding aloof and taking the field 
against them seemed a very long step. Educat- 
ed opinion was sharply divided. From the early 
days of the war there was a strong movement 
in favour of Italy's intervention against Austria 
and Germany. Those who supported intervention 
maintained that it was called for by the interests 
both of Italy and of civilization. As time went 



— 31 - 

on some of them went so far as to protest against 
the conversations between the Italian Govern- 
ment and that of Austria, and declared that to 
have any dealings with her former Allies would 
render Italy an accomplice of their crimes. On 
the other hand, there was a numerous and pow- 
erful body of opinion which was opposed to 
war. There were many reasons which made 
this opposition most natural. Italy had been al- 
lied to Germany and Austria for more than thirty 
years. Though the Alliance had never been popu- 
lar, Italy had prospered greatly during this period, 
and much of her prosperity had been due to 
the association of German money and enterprise 
with her industry. There was a natural feeling 
against reversing the policy of a whole genera- 
tion. Nor was it interest only that inspired this 
feeling. There were very many Italians who felt 
that a complete turn-round would not be " playing 
the game ". Others, who had no tenderness for 
Germany or Austria, thought mainly of Ger- 
many's colossal military power, built up by forty 
years of preparation, and judged that it was 
madness for Italy to join in the struggle. There 
were others again who believed that even victory 
would be too dearly bought. They argued that 
Italy was not rich enough, and not enough de- 
veloped, to stand the strain of modern war. In 



— 32 - 

their view war, even victorious war, mean 
revolution and ruin. 

In spite of all these forcible arguments the 
movement in favour of intervention grew with 
the passing of the months. It was but slowly 
that the truth had its effect upon the great mass 
of Italian opinion, which had no very definite 
views on the subject of peace or war, and was 
content to leave decision to its leaders. Pro- 
gress was difficult, for German propaganda was 
well organized and very active, and there was 
no organized Entente propaganda at all. Still, 
the truth gained ground, and the old antagonism 
to Austria, the traditional enemy, was reinforced 
by a new feeling, a feeling against Germany. 
The story of Belgium sank into the minds of the 
people. It was not easy for Italians to believe 
in the story of deeds of which they could never 
have been guilty, but German propaganda helped 
to bring home the incredible truth. For as the 
chances of war grew greater German agents went 
about threatening that in the event of war Italy's 
" punishment " would be greater than that of 
Belgium. They did not mince words. They 
threatened openly — destruction, murder, rape. 
Italy began to understand. Feeling deepened. 
Anger kindled. 

When the spring was drawing to a close the 



— 33 — 

Italian people was ready for war. It did not 
desire war. There was little heady enthusiasm. 
But the country was quite prepared to accept 
the decision of its leaders. On May 8 came 
the news of the sinking of the Lusitania. '' The 
effect upon the populace " — 1 quote from 
an account written shortly afterwards — " was 
" quite extraordinary. For the first time a note 
" of real anger was heard in the streets and the 
" shops, along the by-ways and in little taverns. 
" The tragedy of Belgium had been told to the 
" people, and its horror had begun to sink in. 
" But all Belgium was enveloped in the fog of 
" war, and there was still a feeling that the 
" worst stories might be exaggerations, that Ger- 
" man riithlessness might have had some provo- 
" cation, and that in many cases there was the 
" excuse of the anger bom of battle and danger 
" Here was a crime committed in the sight of 
" all the world, upon the peaceful seas, against 
" a helpless multitude in which were included 
" many women and children. The feeling against 
" Germany, which had been slowly growing, broke 
" into a blaze. " 

For the first time, the Italian people was 
really stirred. The sinking of the Lusitania 
clinched conviction. It was the public, brazen 
confirmation of German insolence and cruelty, the 



- 34 — 

flaming proof that the Allied indictment of Ger- 
many was true. 

The proof came at a critical moment. The 
Alliance with Austria had been denounced five 
days before, though the fact was not yet public, 
and Germany and Austria were mobilizing their 
last reserves, in the hope oi preventing the final 
step — an Italian declaration of war against Aus- 
tria. They offered further concessions, and knowing 
that Baron Sonnino would not listen they went 
behind the Italian Government and appealed to 
the Opposition — to the Parliamentary leaders 
who were not in favour of Italy's intervention. 
For a moment it seemed as though these intrigues 
might succeed. Signor Giolitti, the leader of the 
« Neutralists » and the most powerful force in 
Italian politics, came to Rome, and his support- 
ers rallied round him. He had long commanded 
a majority both in the Senate and the Chamber. 
It was clear that if this following held together 
he could overthrow the Government. Excitement 
was already intense when it was announced that 
Signor Salandra had resigned. 

Italy rose in anger. From North to South 
a great cry of protest went up against the in- 
trigues of the foreigner, and against the Italians 
who had lent themselves to those intrigues. In 
48 hours it was made plain that a change of 



- 35 - 

government would not be tolerated. Signor Sa- 
landra was recalled to power, and on May 20 
the will of the country was recorded by the 
solemn vote of both Chamber and Senate. 

It mattered nothing that at the moment the 
Russians, so lately triumphant, were being driven 
headlong back through Galicia, almost helpless 
through shortage of arms and ammunition. Italy's 
Allies should never forget that when the Italian 
people confirmed the decision of their leaders the 
war was turning against us. 

Two months earlier, when prospects on the 
Eastern front looked very bright, there was no 
such war feeling in Italy. Many had realized 
the great issues, but they were still a small minor- 
ity. There was at most, speaking generally, a 
readiness to take the field in order to complete 
the national unity. A great change came in a 
short time. A wider vision began to dawn. 
The final blunder of the enemy, the coup that 
was to prevent war, the attempt to manoeuvre 
behind the back of the Government, converted 
innumerable waverers; and others changed their 
view when it was made known how Austria had 
broken the Alliance. One issue at least had 
become plain, that only war could make Italy 
free. 

There were clearer eyes which saw farther 



— 36 - 

still, and there was a general instinct that felt, 
if it did not see. If there were those in Italy 
who did not realize the full import of the struggle, 
they had their counterpart in every Allied country. 
How many Englishmen, Frenchmen, Americans, 
had understood three years ago ? 




Popular demonstrations in favour of War at Rome, Naples ecc. 



Mwm^imi^WM^mmw^^rm 



Chapter III. 

ITALY AT WAR : THE DIFFICULTIES 
OF PREPARATION AND EQUIPMENT 




HEN the European war broke out the 
Italian Army was very badly equip- 
ped, even judging by the generally 
accepted standards of the time, which were so 
soon to be proved obsolete. The late Govern- 
ment had failed to make good the wastage 
caused by the Libyan war, and there were great 
deficiencies in every kind of munitions, equipment 
and stores. Italy had good men, good rifles, and a 
fair proportion of good field-guns, but there was a 
very serious shortage in practically everything else 
that goes to make an Army. The war was to 
show very quickly the importance of heavy ar- 
tillery and of machine-guns. In both of these 
Italy was deplorably weak. Even on paper, the 
Italian Army had a lower proportion of ma- 
chine-guns to men than any other Great Power, 
and the actual number available was far below 
the paper strength. There were a few batteries 

3 



— 38 — 

of good medium -calibre guns and howitzers, but 
there was no modern heavy artillery except in 
fortresses. Although Italy had been the first 
country to use aeroplanes in war, lack of money 
and a failure in insight on the part of those in 
high places had prevented the development in 
military aviation which had been urged by those 
who understood its importance. In August 1914 
the Italian military air service was worth compa- 
ratively little. 

In almost every kind of war material the 
Italian Army was very short of what was then 
considered necessary. Even if war requirements 
had agreed with pre-war calculations there was 
an immense amount of leeway to be made up. It 
is common knowledge now that every calculation, 
on the Allied side at least, was upset. Old requi- 
rements were multiplied tenfold, a hundredfold ; 
completely new requirements came into being. 

In August 1914 Italy had to begin to fill up 
the gaps, for it was clear that in the clamorous 
new world of war there was no place for an 
insufficiently armed nation. During the months 
which followed the gaps widened, quickly, enor- 
mously ; and effort did not keep pace with need. 
When the time came for Italy to join in the 
struggle, her army was still very imperfectly equip- 
ped to meet the immense demands of modern war. 



— 39 - 

A common question is : why did not Italy 
make adequate preparation during the nine months 
of her neutrality, when there was no consump- 
tion of war material, except for ordinary wear 
and tear, and all the energies of the country 
might have been devoted to producing what was 
necessary ? It seems at first sight a pertinent 
question. After all, it might be argued, Italy was 
not plunged into war from one day to another. 
She had time, surely, to study requirements and 
to prepare accordingly. 

The argument is not difficult to answer. In 
the first place it must be remembered that dur- 
ing the period of neutrality the Italian Govern- 
ment was in no position to concentrate upon the 
question of material preparation for war. The 
first problem to be decided, as the pre\ious 
chapter has shown, was whether Italy could or 
would join in the struggle. Till that tremen- 
dous decision was taken it was practically, if not' 
theoretically, impossible to devote adequate atten- 
tion to the problem of war material. Those 
who make the criticism indicated above forget 
that Italy was only brought gradually to the 
brink of war, that the energies of the men who 
had charge of her destinies were chiefly, and 
necessarily, devoted to steering their way through 
an exceedingly difncult diplomatic and political 



40 



situation. At the best their task was very com- 
plicated, and they were further handicapped by 
the fact that they could not take the country 
into their confidence. They were hampered by 
precedent and protocol, by the definite obliga- 
tion of silence. They could not publish, during 
these anxious months, the arguments which when 
they saw the light convinced many an anxious 
waverer and many a stubborn " neutralist ". The 
work of " moral preparation " was rendered much 
more difficult by the fact that the terms of the 
Triple Alliance were secret, and until the moral 
preparation was well advanced, until in fact it 
was probable, if not yet certain, that Italy could 
and would intervene, the Government could hardly 
work out and press forward a comprehensive pro- 
gramme of material preparation for war. It was 
almost inevitable that they should confine them- 
selves to filling the most obvious gaps. 

It may be that Italy was slow to realize the 
necessities of the new warfare. If so, she may 
very well be excused. For others made the same 
mistake, with infinitely less reason. Only a few 
weeks before Italy joined the Allies Mr. Asquith 
affirmed stoutly that we had never suffered from 
a shortage of shells. If the British Prime Min- 
ister could make such an assertion after eight 
months' intimately tragic experience of war, there 



— 41 - 

might seem to be good reason for an Italian fail- 
ure to judge better from a distance. In modem 
war it is not true that the looker-on sees most 
of the game. The special developments and 
consequent necessities left all the standards of 
1914 so quickly behind that only first-hand expe- 
rience could convince. If Italy was slow to 
understand there was ample cause. In any case, 
^ who took so long to feel the facts v/hich 
were continually being hammered into us have 
little right to speak. 

Furthermore, if Italy had understood require- 
ments much sooner than she did. even if by 
some miracle of foresight she had understood at 
once, it ^vould have been materially impossible 
to carry out an adequate programme. During 
the months of waiting she was not even able to 
meet the demands which were known to be oe- 
cessar}'. For she had little money ; her manu- 
facturing capacities were very limited ; her resour- 
ces in metals were largely^ undeveloped, and she 
Lad no coal. 

During the neutrality period the commodities 
w^hich Italy had need of v*ere eagerly sought 
after by countries already engaged in the war, 
countries who were far richer and whose need 
was more obviously urgent. Italy had little 
chance in the competition for war material, or 



— 42 — 

for the wherewithal to make it. Till her deci- 
sion was taken, she had of course to rely almost 
entirely upon her own limited resources. Nor 
when she joined in the struggle was the situation 
greatly changed, to begin with at least. Great 
Britain and France lent money, but money was 
the smaller part of the problem. As regards 
material, others were before her in the market. 
Great Britain and France, so far from being in 
a position to give adequate help, were still unable 
to meet their own requirements and those of 
Russia, and they had the first call upon the manu- 
facturing resources of the United States. Italy 
had to be content with the leavings, and they 
were scanty enough. 

It must be remembered that Italy was far 
less developed industrially than any of the other 
Great Powers. There were, of course, impor- 
tant manufacturing industries which had grown 
rapidly in the years preceding the war, but Ita- 
lian manufactures as compared with those of Great 
Britain and France, Germany and Austria, were 
still in their infancy. Moreover, owing to the 
comparative lack of raw material and the com- 
plete lack of coal, Italy had far less capacity for 
quick development within her own frontiers. Great 
Britain could transform her immense industrial 
resources to war uses; and to a lesser degree 



43 



the same was true of France. And both coun- 
tries had coal. Though France had not enough, 
England*s great surplus lay so near that it was 
readily available. Italy's own resources were very 
limited, and her industrial population relatively 
very small. Her effort had to begin a stage 
further back than that of Great Britain or France. 
With Italy it was less a question of transforming 
industry than of creating it. 

An illustration may make things clearer. Sup- 
pose that on the outbreak of war Great Britain's 
industrial population had been one quarter of what 
it was. Suppose that our industrial activities had 
been limited to Birmingham, Coventry, Bristol, 
Hull, Plymouth, Luton (where straw hats are 
made), and a few other minor manufacturing cen- 
tres or ports of call. Suppose that the rest of 
the country had been like Kent, Dorset, Hamp- 
shire, Suffolk, or the Scottish Highlands. Sup- 
pose that our production of iron ore had been 
one twenty-fifth, and our production of pig-iron 
less than one twentieth, of what they actually 
were. Suppose that we had had only a dozen 
blast furnaces in the country instead of over three 
hundred. Suppose, lastly, that all our coal had 
had to be brought across two thousand miles of 
sea. It is only, perhaps, by some such comparison 
that one can form an idea of Italy's difficulties. 



- 44 — 

Italy's coal requirements before the war were 
very modest, a little under eleven million tons 
being used in 1913, about one twentieth of the 
total amount consumed by the United Kingdom, 
and only a little more than half v/hat we burned 
in blast furnaces alone. 

As soon as the European war broke out, 
coal imports began to diminish, and during the 
last five months of 1914 Italy received over a 
million tons less than in the corresponding period 
of the previous year. During the first five months 
of 1915 the deficit as compared with the pre- 
vious year was nearly a million tons, so that 
during the whole neutrality period Italy had to 
be content with nearly twenty-five per cent less 
coal than the small amount which had served 
her peace requirements. The handicap to indus- 
trial effort may be readily understood from these 
figures. 

An equal difficulty was experienced, all through 
the neutrality period, in obtaining material for 
the iron and steel industries. The import figures 
were much below the peace average. Italy could 
not make adequate preparation for war. And 
so she went to war unprepared. 

During the three years which have, elapsed 
Italy has industrialized herself to an undreamed-of 
extent. But all her efforts have been hampered 




Antonio Salandra 

the Italian Premier 
who declared War on Austria. 



/ 




Baron Sidney Sonnino 

the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
during the whole period of the V7ar. 



- 45 — 

by the difficulty of obtaining raw material and 
coal. Mainly owing to shortage of tonnage, 
though partly on account of the lack of adequate 
accommodation and organization in Italian ports, the 
importation of coal and metals could never keep 
pace with requirements. The coal question in 
particular has caused the gravest difficulty and 
anxiety. In 1916 coal imports fell to eight mil- 
lion tons, but last year the situation became much 
more serious. The total importation from all 
sources came to 5,037,497 tons. This was less 
than half the pre-war figure, and about one-eighth 
of the amount consumed in the domestic stoves 
and fireplaces of the United Kingdom. Nor was 
there any great improvement during the first months 
of this year. Only the strictest economy and the 
patient acceptance of great discomfort, of much 
actual suffering, have carried Italy through these 
long months of crisis. 

The supply of metals and fuel would have 
fallen still more short of the demand if Italy had 
not been able to develop resources which had 
hitherto been untouched, or largely neglected. 
Remote iron deposits have been investigated and 
opened up. Lignite and peat, which were not 
worth burning except on the spot when coal 
was cheap and easily obtainable, have been used 
in considerable quantity, and Italy, like Great 



— 46 — 

Britain, has been driven to cut down her trees. 
Vast quantities of wood have been used as fuel 
for railway locomotives and for central-heating 
furnaces, as well as for military purposes, so that 
the precious and scanty coal may be reserved for 
the most urgent uses of war and transport. It 
must be remembered that the work of developing 
new resources was necessarily hindered by the 
shortage of the very commodities which were being 
sought. To extract metals and fuel from the 
stubborn earth, and transport them to where they 
were needed, required the use of metals and fuel : 
machines, railway engines, railway trucks and coal. 
These were all wanting. They were claimed first 
by the more immediate demands of the war. It 
was only gradually that the material could be 
spared which was required for tapping new sup- 
plies. 

The tonnage problem is easier now ; the work 
of opening up fresh iron and lignite deposits is bear- 
ing fruit; the use of water-power is increasing. A 
great war machinery plant has been installed, though 
there would be room and scope for much more 
if it were possible to secure enough metals and 
enough coal. As it is, factories have often had 
to close down or work half-time, owing to short- 
age of fuel or material. And owing to lack of coal 
a number of new furnaces haye never been used. 



— 47 — 

Looking back over the long struggle to over- 
take the remorseless and ever-increasing demands 
of the war, it seems almost incredible that Italy 
should have done what she has done. Yet all 
her effort, supplemented by such help as the Al- 
lies have been able to give in the way of mu- 
nitions, has not till very recently been able to 
keep pace with demands. During three years' 
fighting there were never enough guns, there was 
never abundance of shells. It is only now that 
the balance begins to hold level. And still there 
is no surplus. 



M^^^^^^^WM^im. w :^K m 



Chapter IV. 

ITALY AT WAR : HER TASK AND 

HER ACHIEVEMENTS 




HE difficulties in the way of preparation 
for war, both political and military, 
have been briefly indicated. And 
Italy*s special difficulties did not end with these. 
A glance at the map shows the great inferiority 
of her strategic position in regard to Austria. The 
frontier with which Italy had to be content after 
the war of 1866 (1) not only left outside her 
borders a large number of Italians. It gave to an 
unfriendly neighbour an immense military advantage. 
The possession of the Trentino by the Aus- 
trians disregards the natural mountain barrier 
which roughly divides the Teuton and Latin races. 
The Trentino, Italy's by right of race and as- 
signed to her by Napoleon in 1 8 1 1 , runs down 
like a great wedge into Italian territory, opening 



(1) Bismarck, like Napoleon III, made peace with 
Austria when he had gained his own ends, but before 
the just claims of his Italian allies had been assured. 



— 50 — 

a wide gateway upon her rich northern plains. 
Such a gap in her natural defences would constitute 
an injustice and a danger wherever it were sit- 
uated, but the position is made very much worse 
by the fact that the line comes so far west. A 
successful enemy advance from the Trentino would 
cut off the wide stretch of territory that lies to 
the east — the plains of Venetia and Friuli, the 
mountain regions of Cadore and Carnia. This 
is the main controlling fact that must govern any 
discussion of the Italian campaign. 

The long frontier, longer than the allied bat- 
tle-front in France, divides itself roughly into three 
sectors. 1 . The Trentino. 2. The great barrier 
of the Dolomites and the Carnic Alps. 3„ The 
eastern frontier from Pontebba to the sea. 

In the first of these sectors the Austrian had 
an immense advantage. The flanks of the great 
salient were well protected ; on the west by a 
huge Alpine mass, traversed by only two feasible 
passes, the Stelvio and the Tonale ; on the east 
by the towering rocks of the Dolomites. On the 
flanks the conditions were equally difficult for 
both sides. Everywhere else the Austrians held 
the commanding positions. The general line of the 
Trentino wedge is broken by little wedges thrust 
forward to dominate all the routes of approach — 
to block an Italian advance or cover an Austrian 



- 51 - 

invasion. Everywhere the Italians had to fight 
uphill. In the second sector it may be said that 
the Dolomites of Cadore and the Ampezzano and 
the savage Carnic Alps made operations on an 
important scale almost equally difficult for either 
side, though the Austrians, owing to the lie of the 
mountain ranges on their side of the frontier, had 
a decided advantage in the way of lateral commu- 
nications. 

The third sector offered the best chances for 
an Italian attack, but here also the conditions 
were exceedingly unfavourable. From Pontebba 
to the Isonzo valley great mountains blocked the 
way. The upper and middle reaches of the 
Isonzo flow through a wild mountainous country, 
which was badly provided with roads. Only 
the extreme southern stretch of the frontier, the 
twenty miles from Cormons to the sea, gave a 
gap where conditions were equal. But this gap 
had little depth. Less than ten miles from the 
frontier lies the rocky plateau of the Carso, which 
together with the hills near Gorizia commands 
all the low ground to the west. The position 
was very fairly summed up in a general order 
which was issued to the Austrian army on the 
Isonzo line at the beginning of the war. The 
troops were told that they were in the position 
of men in a six-story building which had to be 



- 52 - 

attacked from the level. Encouraged by this 
favourable situation they v^ere " to decimate and 
destroy " the enemy. Such was the Austrian 
opinion, fully justified by the facts, of the condi- 
tions in the sector most favourable to the Italians. 

Two courses of action were open to Italy 
when she entered the war. She could hold on 
the north, and push towards the east. Or she 
could stand or the defensive in the east and de- 
vote her attention to eliminating the Trentino 
danger. The first alternative was chosen, for 
reasons which cannot be gainsaid. 

To begin with, the southern sector of the 
eastern line gave the best chance for the deve- 
lopment of a big offensive. There was adequate 
space, and the communications were sufficient. 
And the natural obstacles, however great, were 
much less formidable than anywhere else. Se- 
condly, a very important objective lay compara- 
tively near. A successful advance upon Trieste 
would have dealt a crushing blow to Austria. It 
would have meant infinitely more than the occupation 
of the Trentino, both from the military point of view 
and the political. A successful invasion of the 
Trentino could hardly have led any further, for 
northern Tyrol must be considered impregnable. 
Austria could scarcely receive a vital wound from 
any operations in this direction. The occupation 




I. Col <di Lana seen from the Cordevole Valley. — 2. Scout on Col di Lana. 
3. Alpini climbing the Tofana. — 4. Arsiero and Mount Pria Fora. — 5. Shelters 
for the Alpini on the Adamello. 



53 



of Trieste, on the other hand, besides being im- 
portant in itself as an Italian triumph and an 
Austrian defeat, besides being a goal might well 
have been a starting point for further military 
success. And it might have had grave political 
consequences : it might have hastened the disrup- 
tive tendencies within the Austrian Empire. 

These considerations could not be neglected, 
and General Cadoma took the bold course : the 
bold course, for it meant carrying out his prin- 
cipal military operations a hundred miles east of 
the dangerous salient of the Trentino, which was 
an ever-present threat to his communications. This 
meant that he could not bestow his whole strength 
upon the point selected for his offensive. In ad- 
dition to his main thrust he had to carry out 
what may be described as an active defensive in 
the Trentino salient. He had to close the open 
door even if he could not bolt and bar it. This 
was successfully accomplished in the early days 
of the war, when quick forward movements reduced 
the advantage held by the enemy, but the fact 
that the door could only be closed, not locked, 
meant that the Italian Army was never free from 
the fear of a blow in the back. It meant also 
that a large number of men and guns were ne- 
cessary to protect the threatened lines. 

The question has been asked, and will be 

4 



- 54 — 

asked again, no doubt, why the Italians could 
not combine more vigorous action on the north 
with their main push towards the east. The 
answer is the same as that which must be returned 
to the question why various tempting military 
enterprises were not undertaken by Italy's allies 
at various periods of the war : " Not enough 
troops and not enough munitions ". 

In 1914 Italy's active army consisted of 25 
infantry divisions with artillery, and 3 cavalry 
divisions, with a mobilisation strength of about 
400,000 combatants. There was in addition the 
organized Mobile Militia, consisting of men between 
29 and 32 years of age, who had served their 
time with the colours and in the first reserve - 
eight years in all. The total strength of this force 
was about 320,000, the organization taking in 
some 200,000 men on mobilization. Behind 
these first- and second-line forces was the Terri- 
torial Militia, organized in infantry battalions, for- 
tress artillery companies and engineer companies, 
made up of the older classes of trained men and 
those who had had no military training. It must 
be remembered that Italy's first- and second- line 
organization was small in proportion to her popu- 
lation. Only a sufficient number of men was 
taken each year to fill the peace establishment of 
the Army, with the result that only about 35 



— 55 — 

per cent of each annual " class " joined the col- 
ours for full training. The proportion of untrained 
men in the Reserve and Territorial Militia was 
therefore very large. 

Italy had nine months in which to expand 
her peace organization, and though for political 
reasons which have been explained that time 
could not be used to the full, much was done. 
A great number of new formations were raised, 
but there were two main difficulties — officers and 
munitions. It is too often forgotten that man- 
power pure and simple is a factor that comes 
into play comparatively late, when organization, 
both on the front and at home, is relatively com- 
plete. In the early months of the war what counted 
was the man-power which was already trained, 
organized and adequately officered. Expansion 
was necessarily a slow and tedious work, strictly 
conditioned by the supply of officers and equipment. 
It follows that only a limited number of the new 
Italian formations were ready for war in May 1915. 
And the word " ready " is not really justified, 
for there were not enough guns and machine-guns 
to go round. 

It will be clear that the number of troops 
available for war in the summer of 1915 was 
very small in relation to the frontier of 484 miles, 
all the more so when the unfavourable conditions 



- 56 - 

on the Trentino border are taken into account. 
It is often said that a great part of the long 
frontier must be left out of calculation, owing to 
impossibility of conducting military operations on 
a large scale among the higher Alps or the Do- 
lomites. That is only true to a certain extent, 
for modern war has swarmed over the mountains 
and peopled the inaccessible places. In earlier 
da5^s war was confined to the valleys, where the 
little armies of those times met and fought with 
ample room for quick victory or defeat. Military 
operations must still follow the main routes, the 
main gaps in the barrier, but man's incredible 
efforts have made it possible to outflank those 
gaps by movements which would have been judged 
impossible a few years ago. An important advance 
must always depend upon the main routes, but 
these main routes may be opened by other means 
than direct frontal attack. No line can be left 
unguarded, even in the Alpine and Dolomite re- 
gions, it is true that the number of men required 
to defend these crests and ridges is small in 
comparison with their actual extent in mileage, 
but on the other hand the number of men re- 
quired for transport is relatively very large. The 
difficulty of conveying food and ammunition to 
the soldiers in line is immense. On a rough cal- 
culation it may be said that to keep one man in 



__ 57 — 

the " battle positions " meant having no less than 
six men behind him. And even that proportion 
meant changing the troops in line all too seldom. 
Italy's special difficulties have been briefly 
indicated. It remains to give some brief account 
of her achievements. These have been clouded 
unjustly by the disaster of Caporetto, which not 
only wiped out nearly all the gains of twenty- 
nine months' hard fighting but led to the loss of 
Cadore, Carnia, Friuli and a part of the Veneto. 
The great value of Italy's contribution to the 
Allied cause can no longer be measured in terms 
of victorious advance or of territory occupied. 
Yet it remains almost incalculable ; and indeed 
that was never the right way to estimate her 
services. Putting aside for a moment the moral 
significance of Italy's intervention, of her patience 
and long effort on behalf of freedom and justice, 
we have only to consider what would have been 
the material effect upon the course of the war if 
she had remained neutral. In the summer of 
1915, when armies were smaller than they became 
later, though still gigantic in comparison with pre- 
vious wars, the Italians engaged permanently some 
400,000 Austrian troops, who would otherwise 
have been free for operations elsewhere. By the 
following year the number of Italy's adversaries 
was increased by fifty per cent, and the Austrians 



— 58 — 

were put to a constant strain to replace the heavy 
losses caused by the fighting that went on almost 
without a break from May till November. Last 
year Italy's task became heavier still, owing to 
the gradual decay of the Russian resistance. All 
through the summer she had to fight against the 
pick of the Austrian army, kept up to strength 
by a continuous flow of men and gun's from the 
Eastern Front. In the autumn, when Russia had 
completely gone out of the struggle, the enemy 
forces on the Italian Front were increased to 62 
divisions, 1 2 of which were German. 

The enemy thrust on the Middle Isonzo last 
October brought disaster to Italian arms, but the 
wonderful recovery of the soldiers after the great 
retreat and the splendid determination of the 
people prevented that disaster being turned to full 
account. It was a terrible blow, that sent Italy 
staggering to the ropes. But Italy was game. 
Italy fought on, weary, breathless, almost heart- 
broken, but with a stubborn courage, wath a 
spirit that burned unfaltering. The greater danger 
was overcome. And it is sometimes strangely 
forgotten that the enemy advance was checked 
before the troops dispatched in aid by Great 
Britain and France came into line. During the 
last three critical weeks of November, on the 
Piave and in the mountains, Italy fought alone. 



- 59 — 

In December too, although the British and French 
had taken up their positions, the enemy's last 
desperate effort to break through was directed 
entirely against the mountain line held by the 
Italians. 

This year, in the middle of June, the Austrian 
Army on the Italian Front consisted of 73 divi- 
sions, practically the whole of Austria's effective 
strength. The total number of enemy battalions 
was 960, for it must he remembered that the 
Austrian division has not been reduced in strength, 
and is 25 per cent stronger than the British or 
German division of to-day. No fewer than 54 
divisions (774 battalions), with 6000 guns (1), 
were massed upon the battle front between the 
Trentino and the sea. It should be fresh in the 
minds of all how the great Austrian attack came 
to absolute failure, broken to pieces against a 
resistance that was a luminous example of brav- 
ery and skill. We have only to think for a moment 
to see what the situation of the Allies would 



(1) Austria has always had a considerably larger 
number of guns on the whole front than Italy, though 
Italy, when she was attacking, was able to obtain a 
local superiority by concentration upon a given sector. 
During the great battle which began on June 15 of 
this year, the enemy superiority was calculated at 25 
per cent, mainly in heavy and medium calibres. 



— 60 - 

have been to-day if these Austrian divisions could 
have been thrown upon the hard-pressed front in 
France. Yet this is only a particular, striking 
confirmation of the general truth, that without 
Italy, as without any one of the Allies, the war 
on land would have ended already in a German 
triumph. 

Italy's chief material contribution to the Allied 
cause is to be found in the fact that she has 
fully occupied the attention, first, of half the 
Austrian Army, and now of all the troops which 
the Monarchy can put in line. Alike in victory 
and in defeat she has kept the enemy busy along 
her front. But her contribution does not end 
here. She plays a very important part in " keeping 
our end up " in the Balkans. For two years 
there has been a strong Italian force in Macedon- 
ia. By the spirit and fighting capacity of its 
troops, by its admirable organization and perfect 
equipment, this force has won the admiration of 
all who have come in contact with it.^ The 
Italian force in Albania, which has done first-class 
work both in battle and in opening up communi- 
cations in a trackless country, forms the left wing 
of the Allied Balkan front and brings it in close 
touch with Italy. Thanks to the intervention of 
Italy, moreover, we can send our troops for the 
east overland as far as the southern Italian ports. 



— 61 - 

and so avoid two thousand miles of dangerous 
sea transport. 

There is another point which has not received 
adequate attention. In order to concentrate her 
efforts on the main work of the war Italy has 
had to make a heavy sacrifice. When the 
newly- won colony of Libya blazed into insurrection 
under the influence of Turkish machinations and 
German gold, the Italians withdrew to the coast, 
and remained there, rather than divert from the 
common fields of struggle the troops which would 
have restored the situation. The strong temptation 
to reinforce the garrison by an adequate expedi- 
tionary force has always been resisted, and there 
has been complete acquiescence in the decision, 
Italy's allies should always remember that she 
sent troops to fight in the Balkans and in France 
when she could spare none to regain the ground 
lost in her own colony. 

Italy's great military efforts have imposed a 
very severe strain upon the country. Out of a 
population of about 36 millions well over five 
million men have been taken for military service. 
Italy has not called upon her older classes to the 
same extent as Great Britain or France, but she 
has made a much cleaner sweep of the classes 
between 20 and 40 years of age, granting rela- 
tively fewer exemptions. When the attempt was 



— 62 — 

made to draw further upon the older men, it was 
found that the necessities of food production would 
not allow it. The critical food situation last year 
was partly due to shortage of labour, and the 
attempt to " comb out " further had to be aban- 
doned. As it is, the agricultural districts are 
almost denuded of able-bodied men, and the work 
is carried on with great difficulty. The nineteen- 
year-old boys have long been in the field — some 
of them won bright laurels on the Piave last 
November — and the greater part of the 1 900 
class has already undergone its training. 

Nor must the work of the Navy be forgotten. 
The problem of the Adriatic is immensely diffi- 
cult, as those of the Allies who have co-operated 
with the Italian fleet have found. But some if 
not all of the difficulties have been solved. It is 
only occasionally that the veil can be lifted to 
allow a glimpse of the " silent work " that goes 
on unceasingly ; till more can be told no picture 
can be given of the part played by the Italian 
Navy. There have been failures as well as suc- 
cesses, but some of the successes would give 
cause for pride to any Navy in the world. Captain 
Rizzo's feat of torpedoing the Austrian dreadnought 
Szent Istvan is one of the most brilliant exploits 
of the war, but it is not only the daring and 
skill of the act that bring honour to the Italian 



— 63 — 

Navy. Rizzo's splendid work was the fruit of 
months and years of patient watching. How 
many tim.es have the little ships lain in wait, in 
vain ? The truth only comes home when we 
realize that the Szent Istvan met her doom the 
first time that she went cruising in two-and-a-half 
years. But here again, on sea as on land, Italy's 
services may best be understood, not from a re- 
cital of successes, but from a general survey of 
the situation. Thanks to Italy's intervention and 
the Italian occupation of Valona the naval activ- 
ities of the enemy have been largely thwarted 
and checked. We have only to keep in mind 
how the situation in the Mediterranean would 
have developed to the advantage of the enemy 
if the Allies had not held both sides of the 
Straits of Otranto. 

The facts given in this chapter are most of 
them obvious and all elementary. But it is only 
by holding the broad facts steadily in view that 
we can appreciate the great part which Italy 
plays in the struggle for a better to-morrow. 



M mm ^^cwM vmn H^mrm 



Chapter V 




ANGL04TALIAN RELATIONS 

RIENDSHIP between Great Britain and 
^ Italy is traditional : its roots lie very far 
back. The Anglo-Saxon civilization 
is mainly based upon what we received from 
Rome and from the Italy of the Renaissance, 
and we have gone on drawing from Italy ever 
since. In the old days we were consciously pupil 
to master. Italy taught us, Italy gave to us, and 
it is our pride that we knew how to use her 
teaching and her gifts. No man of education, 
if he stops to think, can but be overwhelmed by 
the magnitude of our debt to Italy. 

There came a time when it seemed we could 
do something towards the payment of that debt, 
when the Italian peoples were struggling towards 
freedom again. In those days British sympathy 
went out to Italy in full measure. English poets 
sang the Italian cause, and Italy's exiled patriots 
found shelter and support in England, drawing 
much from England and from the contact with 
English life and English culture. Yet even at 



66 



that moment, when we were paying some of our 
old debt, we were also incurring a new one. 
Italy was still giving royally. She was giving us 
Mazzini — the greatest prophet of the political 
principles for which the anti- German alliance is 
fighting to-day. We were not ripe for Mazzini 
then, and even now they are a limiled number 
who recognize all that we owe him in the way 
of political thought. In fact, we have gone on 
taking from Italy, hardly knowing that we took. 
The contact so long established was still fruitful, 
but on our side the new gains were now largely 
unconscious. There was recognition of what we 
owed to the Italy of the past, but an incomplete 
appreciation of the new Italy. Sympathy and 
affection have been there, but not understanding. 

Italy, on the other hand, was conscious of 
what she took from England. And she was 
more than grateful. There is no more striking 
instance of the reward that comes to genuine 
sympathy than the long persistence of the feeling 
towards England which was born in Italy during 
the struggle for her freedom. The official sup- 
port that we gave to Italy was strictly limited. But 
Italy felt, and recorded on the tablets of her 
heart, the sympathy and moral support of the 
British people. 

These were the controlling facts in the re- 



— 67 — 

lations between Great Britain and the new King- 
dom. The friendship which has so happily re- 
mained unbroken was never based on protocol 
or the nice calculations of official diplomacy. It 
was a friendship, essentially, which had its strength 
in unofficial relations, in the mutual sympathy of 
informed opinion, in the possession of kindred 
ideals, in the recognition of what each race owed 
to, and could take from, the other. Given these 
foundations, official friendship was easy, almost 
inevitable, and there has never been any serious 
friction between the British and Italian Govern- 
ments. It has been seen that a Mediterranean 
agreement with Great Britain was regarded by 
the best minds in Italy as the necessary comple- 
ment to the Triple Alliance, but Italian policy 
went further than this. For twenty years after 
the formation of the Triple Alliance the declara- 
tion of the Italian Government stood on record, 
that the obligations of Italy under the terms of 
the Alliance should not apply as against Great 
Britain. Anglo -Italian friendship was still the 
centre-point of Italian policy. 

It was not until towards the close of the 
nineteenth century that the opposition between the 
Alliance and the friendship began to define itself, 
and this opposition led to the weakening of both. 
The gradual accentuation of German hostility to 



- 68 - 

Great Britain, which placed the two Powers 
fairly and squarely in opposite camps, had a 
chilling influence upon the feeling of very many 
Italians towards the Triple Alliance. They feared 
that its obligations might bring Italy into direct 
antagonism with Great Britain, and they recognized 
that in any event the old relations were bound 
to be affected unfavourably. These relations were 
so affected. For iihere were other Italians who, 
faced by the apparent necessity of a choice between 
Great Britain and Germany, felt that the choice 
would have to be in favour of the ally rather 
than the friend. 

Quite apart from the fact of the Alliance, 
there were strong reasons for such a decision. 
For, during the last twenty years before the war, 
or even a longer period, the contact between 
Italy and Great Britain had somehow loosened. 
There was warm friendship still, but it was rather 
the sentiment of old friends parted than that of 
comrades in close touch. Both countries, in fact, 
were suffering from German influence. Great Bri- 
tain, without altogether knowing it, was being 
taken in by German pretensions to universal su- 
periority. She was inclining to turn away from 
the Latin fount. And Italy was coming more and 
more definitely under German sway. This was ine- 
vitable. For France paid little attention to Italy; 



English and Italian soldiers on the Italian Front. 





— 69 - 

Great Britain still divided her affections between 
Rome, the Renaissance and the Risorgimento ; 
Germany studied the needs of the growing King- 
dom. German bankers and men of business, 
German commercial travellers and German pro- 
fessors, all spread the German gospel throughout 
Italy, and few of them failed to preach that the 
days of the British Empire were more or less 
numbered. And it must be confessed that, so 
far as British efforts in Italy were concerned, 
there was not very much to indicate that the 
German apostles were wrong. 

There were good reasons why German ideals, 
as they were understood before the war, should 
make special appeal to Italians bent upon progress. 
Germany seemed to stand, above all things, for 
organization and order; she was strong where 
Italy felt herself weak. Germany was the home 
of respect for the State, of social discipline, of 
patient attention to detail. The average Italian 
was still inclined to look upon the Government 
as his natural enemy. His intense individualism 
resented the impositions of the State, and Italian 
organization too often broke down owing to light- 
hearted disregard of small but essential factors. 
Thinking Italians saw their own weakness, and 
many of them came to the conclusion that the 
remedy was to be found in Germany. 



— 70 — 

German patience and thoroughness, German or- 
der and discipline (very well advertised by eloquent 
servants of the German plan) commended them- 
selves widely in Italy. Yet, even before the war, 
there was a growing feeling that the German 
influence made for harm, concealed a danger. 
When kalian disciples of Germanism began to 
preach the Prussian faith, the conscience and 
instinct of Italy began to work. And when the 
great test came, Italy's rejection of the real Ger- 
manism was definite and emphatic. 

This should have been the moment for a 
renewal of all the did warmth of feeling between 
Great Britain and Italy. We had always been 
friends, even if latterly we had lost contact a 
little, and now at last we were allies, fighting 
side by side in the most tremendous military 
struggle between good and evil that the world 
has ever known. Yet it is true that there has 
been almost more misunderstanding between Great 
Britain and Italy during the three years of our 
alliance than when we were nominally ranged on 
opposite sides of the widening gulf that cut Europe 
in two. In these three years we have reaped 
the fruit of the long period when we were growing 
apart unconsciously, believing ourselves close friends 
but losing the mutual knowledge we once had. 

The misunderstandings came very easily. 



— 71 — 

There was always someone to make mischief, 
wilfully, by playing upon ignorance, or innocently, 
by jumping at unjustified conclusions. Enemy 
propaganda worked untiringly in Italy, to suggest 
that Great Britain had dragged Italy into the 
war for her own selfish purposes, that the loans 
we gave bore an enormous rate of interest, and 
that we were bleeding our allies by the exor- 
bitant prices of the necessities we sold to them 
and by the vast sums charged for freight. These 
were gross falsehoods, easily exposed, if only 
London and Rome had put their heads together 
and agreed to speak. But no such simple so- 
lution commended itself. To take one point 
alone, it was not until 38 months after Italy's 
entry into the war that the British Government 
announced officially that it lent money to Italy at 
a slightly lower rate than it paid to investors in 
British War Loans. 

These and kindred misunderstandings would 
never have made any progress if they had been 
promptly tackled at the outset. As it was, the 
charges remained unanswered so long that they 
sank in and affected many minds. They were the 
more readily accepted as conditions of life became 
more difficult and the casualty lists grew longer. 
The increase of suffering and sacrifice gave point 
to the enemy suggestions, false though they were. 



-11 - 

Critics of Great Britain were on firmer ground 
wken they alleged that we were slow to under- 
stand Italy's difficulties and needs and to appreciate 
her war aims. And they were unassailably right 
when they complained that both Great Britain 
and France discriminated between Germany and 
Austria, showing a different degree of enmity to the 
two chief enemies. It was natural that British and 
French popular opinion should make this discri- 
mination. We and the French were at close 
grips with Germany ; Austria's efforts were only 
directed against our allies. What made the 
question more serious was that both British and 
French Governments appeared to have, and did 
have, a certain tenderness for Austria. For long,, 
moreover, they clung to the belief that Austria 
could be " detached " from her alliance with the 
arch-criminal. 

This attitude naturally caused anxiety in Italy. 
Italians were not unready to accept the contention 
that Germany was the chief villain, the more 
dangerous foe to civilization. But the more 
immediate danger to them came from Austria, 
and they knew very well, what Englishmen were 
very slow to understand, that the Habsburg Mon- 
archy was Germany's vassal, bound hand and 
foot to Germany's designs. They saw in tha 
relatively Austrophil tendency of Great Britain and 



— 13 — 

France a very grave danger to Italy's future, and 
the apprehension thus aroused explains many 
things. It explains, above all, one of the main 
causes for the misunderstanding in England of 
Italy's part in the vy^ar, and of her war aims. 

These causes may be classed under three 
heads : 

1 . The delay in the Italian declaration of 
war against Germany, which gave great opportu- 
nity to mischief-makers. 

2. The appearance of detachment from 
the general aims of the Alliance, and of an Im- 
perialistic tendency ; an appearance which arose 
from a few unfortunate phrases, from the 
exaggerations of a section of the Italian press, 
and from a misunderstanding of the London 
Agreement. 

3. The failure to appreciate the great 
difficulties by which the Italian Government and 
the Italian Army were faced, and the achieve- 
ments to their credit. 

The third question has been treated in the 
first four chapters. The other two points can 
be dealt with much more briefly. 

When Italy declared war against Austria it 
was expected that Germany's declaration of war 
against Italy would follow as a matter of course. 
Prince von Bulow had warned Baron Sonnino that 



— 74 — 

war with Austria meant war with Germany, and 
Italy was fully prepared for the complete breaks 
A month previously she had signed the London 
Agreement, which pledged her to consider the ene- 
mies of the Triple Entente as hers, and to make 
war against them " with all means at her disposal. " 
The formal declaration of hostilities obviously 
fell to be made by Germany, but the German 
Government held its hand. Weeks passed, months r 
and still the German Government kept silent. 
German submarines attacked Italian shipping; a 
few German troops and German guns appeared 
in the field against Italy ; people began to ask 
why Italy did not take the step that should have 
been taken by Germany. In short, matters went 
as Germany had calculated ; for it is fairly certain 
that Germany refrained from declaring war against 
Italy not only in the expectation of encouraging 
the Italian Neutralists to further efforts, but in 
the hope of creating distrust of Italy in the minds 
of her new allies. People began to exercise their 
suspicious faculties, and some who ought to have 
known better declared that Italy was playing a 
double game, that she wished to keep a foot in 
the enemy's camp. In support of this theory it 
was alleged that on the eve of war Italy had 
concluded a secret treaty with Germany which 
clearly showed how the land lay. 



75 



This was mere gossip. There was an agreement 
between Italy and Germany, but it was not secret, 
and it was not of the kind suggested. When 
Italian intervention was imminent the Italian 
Government proposed both to Germany and 
to Austria that in the event of war each 
country should 1) respect private property be- 
longing to the subjects of the other within its own 
borders, and 2) permit the repatriation of the 
other's subjects. The first provision worked out 
to the advantage of Germany and Austria, who 
had important interests in Italy. The second, on 
the other hand, favoured Italy ; for there was a 
very large number of Italians, principally of the 
working class, resident in Germany and Austria. 

Germany accepted the Italian proposal, while 
Austria did not; and the fact of the agreement 
was the basis for much mischievous speculation. 
Yet it was practically nothing more than an attempt 
to re-affirm principles which had generally been 
supposed to govern the conduct of States at war. 
And it deliberately provided for war between 
Italy and Germany. That it could be made the 
foundation of a critical attitude towards Italy was 
altogether unfair. But the fact shows how Italy's 
position was compromised in the public opinion 
of her Allies by the delay in formally declaring 
war against Germany. 



— 76 — 

The true reason for the delay was not poli- 
tical, but military. Politically, the situation was 
fully covered by Italy's undertakings under the 
London Agreement, and by her subsequent adhesion 
to the Pact of London. In point of fact it was 
only Italy who suffered from the absence of formal 
hostilities between herself and Germany. From 
the military point of view the delay was almost 
certainly a gain. In any event it was prudent, 
and fully justified. In consideration of Italy's 
military weakness during the first year of the war, 
and of the fact that her Allies could spare her 
little help, it was quite obviously to the general 
advantage of the Alliance that she should not 
have to face Germany as well as Austria. Ger- 
many's game was to go for the weaker adversaries, 
one after the other, and the possession of the 
interior lines gave her a great advantage. A pre- 
mature declaration of war on the part of Italy 
might very well have hastened the day when 
Germany saw that she had nothing to expect 
from her old friends, and so led to an attack 
that Italy could hardly have withstood. Italy had 
to face the risk of such an attack when she made 
her original declaration of war against Austria, 
but it was to her advantage, and ours, that she 
should gain time. 

The misunderstanding regarding Italy's position 




The monument to Dante in Trento, 




The old Cathedral of S. Giusto in Trieste, 



77 



vis-a-vis to Qfirrri'^ny was in th^ main r^.mov<:r], 
tfjouj^h not altogether, by the formal rJf:r;laration 
of war which came two year* ago. The second 
rnisunderatandinL^ still perai^t^. 

It w<j^ perfiapa only natural that British puhlic 
opinion should be affected unfavourably by tfie 
claims and ar^jm^nts put forward, ably and per- 
sistently, by a limited number of extremists, f'or 
fjfitish public opinion was not able to estimate 
the weight of Italian opinion behind these utter- 
ances, and sections of the f^ritish press exaggerated 
thdr significance to an astonishing degree, attri- 
buting to thern an importanc: and an insp>iration 
which they never posse?Aed. A similar exagger- 
ated importance, or rather a misinterpretation, was 
given to certain phrases - " sa/:red egoism ", " our 
war **, " Italy will act on her cv/n " — which 
were taken hz meaning that Italy's prAicy wa.s 
primarily selfi.-^h, and that particular Italian interests 
nece?>-»ari]y took prer^rdenry: of the demands of the 
common cause. If that were true, it would merely 
Fix upon h^aly ^ charge that rrnght at tirnC'v have 
f>^:en brought with an equal show of ju-.tic^; ^jg^iinst 
each one of the Allies, especially during the earlier 
part of the war. But these phras^:^. never m':ant 
what most outside critics took thern to mean. Their 
true irnp<>rt has been very v/ell explained by a 
writer in the Anglo-Italian Review, who ?.ays: 



— 78 - 

" They were not the expression of an active 
" policy, but were a reply to and a reaction 
" against the accusations that had been made 
" against Italy — certainly of Austrian and Ger- 
" man origin — to the effect that Italy had been 
^ bought by France and England and dragged 
" into the war against her will. They expressed 
" Italian indignation at these accusations and denied 
" them by asserting that Italy had not come into 
" the war at the orders or the request of others, 
" but on her own initiative and for her own 
" ends ". 

The phrases which made such an unfortunate 
impression in certain quarters were never intended 
to be an indication of Italy's attitude towards 
the world struggle. They were a definite answer 
to a definite insinuation — an answer moreover 
that was framed to appeal to a special audience, 
the Italian people : not to the wider audience 
of the world. An understanding of Italy's cir- 
cumstances would have prevented misinterpretation. 
A consideration of Italy's actions would have had 
the same result. But this was a case where 
words spoke louder than actions, or at least made 
more impression upon uninformed minds. 

Unfortunately the charge of imperialism, and 
of the pursuit of ends incompatible with the gen- 
eral aims of the Allies, seemed at first sight, to 



— 19- 

many people at least, to find support in the terms 
of the London Agreement of April 1915. 

The terms of that Agreement do undoubtedly 
depart from the principle of nationality which has 
come to be the inspiring idea of the Allied 
programme. Leaving aside the question how far 
certain of the war aims of Italy's allies, as stated 
from time to time and subsequently revealed, 
conform to the principle of nationality, an 
examination of the circumstances which governed 
the London Agreement shows that much of 
the criticism levelled against it is wide of the 
mark. 

The main cause of offence lies of course in 
the fact that the fulfilment of its terms would 
imply too great a renunciation on the part of the 
Southern Slavs, whose freedom and unity now 
form part of the Allied programme. But Southern 
Slav independence was certainly not in the Allied 
programme in April 1915 or for long afterwards. 
The London Agreement was not directed against 
a potential Yugoslavia, in whose possible creation 
only a few men who had given the subject special 
study at that time believed, but against Italy's 
traditional enemy — Austria. 

If the Habsburg Empire survived the war, it 
was essential for Italy to secure certain frontiers 
and to assure her naval position in the Adriatic, 



— 80 — 

and at that date there was little reason to believe 
that the Habsburg Empire would not survive the 
war. In point of fact, when the London Agree- 
ment was signed and for nearly three years after, 
Italy's Allies cherished the hope that Austria 
could be detached from Germany and forced to 
a separate peace. The liberation of Austria's 
subject races was obviously incompatible with 
such a hope, and until very recently none of the 
Allied Governments seem to have thought ser- 
iously of an independent Yugoslavia. 

Nor was it clear in 1915 that the Yugoslav 
movement had sufScient support from the Yugo- 
slavs. To those who reproach Italy with slowness 
in appreciating the reality of the movement the 
answer may very well be given that it was not 
until the end of the third year of the war that 
the Southern Slav representatives agreed upon a 
statement of their own aims. Till these aims 
were published in the Pact of Corfu it was not 
at all clear that the Serbians and the various re- 
presentatives of the Southern Slavs of the Mon- 
archy were in agreement as to the future they 
desired. There still remained the question how 
far the exiled leaders of the Croatians, Slovenes 
and Serbs of the Monarchy could speak for their 
countrymen. That question still formed an obs- 
tacle to cautious minds, but for the majority of 



— 81 — 

thinking Italians the Pact of Corfu removed the 
main difficulty in the way of coming to an under- 
standing with the Southern Slavs. A number of 
writers and speakers had long advocated such an 
understanding, but it was difficult to press the 
matter when there was no pledge of unity of 
intention on the other side. 

The publication of the Pact of Corfu had an 
immediate effect in Italy. The movement in favour 
of an understanding at once gathered strength and 
impetus, and it led straight to the historic Con- 
gress of Nationalities oppressed by Austria, which 
was held in Rome in April 1918. The way 
was not easy for those who worked to this great 
end. The movement was checked at the very 
outset by the apparent lack of sympathy with 
Italian aims, and the evident tendresse for Aus- 
tria, displayed by the speeches of certain Allied 
ministers. It was checked again, for a moment, 
by the disaster of Caporetto. 

The suggestion has been made, by some in 
good faith, by some in malice, that Caporetto 
was responsible for the understanding between 
Italians and Southern Slavs — that Italy's eyes 
were only opened by misfortune. That is wholly 
untrue. The fact is that Caporetto made many 
hesitate to press the movement. They foresaw 
the comment that would be made, that has been 



— 82 - 

made ; and they held back. It was only after 
much searching of heart that they renewed their 
efforts. 

It is necessary to emphasize the fact that it 
was not only " Italian Imperialism " which proved 
an obstacle to an understanding between Italian 
and Southern Slav. The Italian Nationalist had 
his counterpart in the Yugoslav extremist, who 
was as anxious to swallow lands indubitably Ita- 
lian as the Nationalist was to annex Slav terri- 
tories. It was unfortunate that those Englishmen 
who rebuked Italy for Imperialism had no open 
word of blame for certain Slav claims. The ap- 
parent onesidedness of their judgment did a good 
deal to retard progress towards the understanding 
they desired. For it made Italians hesitate to re- 
nounce what was assured to them by bond, and 
it helped those whose aim it was to make mis- 
<:hief between Italy and Great Britain. 

The Rome Congress gave formal sanction to 
an understanding between Italy and the Southern 
Slavs that was based, practically speaking, on a 
readiness to renounce particular aims for the sake 
of the common cause. It meant that in the event 
of the hoped-for victory both sides agreed to 
^bate the maximum programmes put forward in 
the Agreement of London and the Pact of Corfu 



— 83 — 

respectively. And the Italian Premier's speech 
to the delegates to the Congress gave Government 
approval to its declarations. 

Circumstances had changed. There was now 
the hope at least that the truth about Austria 
was beginning to be realized by the Allies. It 
may be that some of the original demands of the 
London Agreement were ill-advised, that it would 
have better to think less of apparent security and 
risk something for an ideal, even though that 
ideal had so far commended itself to none of the 
Allies. It is more easy to see clearly to-day. 
Those who criticize the Italian attitude as shown 
by the London Agreement, or are impatient at 
the caution still displayed in certain quarters, 
would do well to remind themselves how long 
it took for Italy's Allies to understand the mean- 
ing of Austria, how late in time it was before 
the cause of the oppressed nationalities was fully 
recognized by them. 

Italy's claims are not, and never were, im- 
perialist in nature. She claims the recovery of 
her unredeemed lands and frontier positions that 
shall give her a fair chance of self-defence. In 
so far as her claims have been extended to loc- 
alities not inhabited by Italians, these claims may 
be justified by that necessity for " guarantees " 



— 84 — 

which has been invoked by our own statesmen. 
If to-day Italy can consider the possibility of 
waiving some of these " guarantees ", it is be- 
cause her Allies as well as herself have seen 
more clearly. 




View of Trento. 




View of Trieste. 



mmm^^^^wmo^^[^^[M 



Chapter VI. 
ITALY AND THE PEOPLE OF ITALY 




REAT Britain and Italy are allies now 
and for after the war, and there is 
urgent reason that each should know 
what manner of men they are who are fighting 
side by side. The meeting of Italians and Bri- 
tish on the same fronts should mean the best kind 
of propaganda. Countless Italians have learned 
more about Englishmen from the men they have 
met in the Italian war zone than they could 
have done in any other way. Thousands of 
Englishmen should carry back from their stay in 
the country a far truer impression of Italy and 
the Italians than the vast majority of the tourists 
who have visited Italy. And they will spread 
the knowledge. But they are few, after all. The 
handicap of language is great, and the contact is 
limited. There is always room for explanation 
and illustration. 

It is never an easy matter to explain the 
people of one hation to those of another, and 

6 



- 86 — 

there is a special difficulty in the case of Italians 
and Englishmen. It is not only that we differ 
greatly. The task is made harder by the fact that 
each, generally speaking, starts with a wrong idea 
of the other. Happily, there is a natural sym- 
pathy which tides over many misunderstandings, 
but if we could add to the sympathy a better 
knowledge, the misunderstandings would arise much 
less often. 

At the beginning of the war the Austrians 
dubbed the Italians " mandoline-players ^\ The 
Italians accepted the name, and many a time they 
have made the Austrians dance to their tune. 
But at the time it was given, in derision, it re- 
presented a tendency that was not confined to 
Austria alone. What did the world know of Italy 
before the war, such part of the world at least as 
had no real contact with the Italians of to-day ? 
Italy was a storehouse of art, a marvellous museum 
set in enchanting surroundings, a perennial fount 
of music — all kinds of music from grand opera 
to the open-air songs of Naples and Venice. A 
country of colour and form and light and song — 
this was the popular impression among those who 
had never seen Italy : and of those who had vis- 
ited the country how many saw beyond the first 
fascination, unless to find grounds for complaint 
in the hotels or the cabs or the train service ? 



— 87 — 

How many touched the people of Italy, the real 
people, not merely those who cater for tourists, 
and are too often spoiled by them ? 

It was all very natural, of course. The young 
Kingdom of Italy was overshadowed by the mon- 
uments of a tremendous past, and what we 
should call its more serious activities were lost 
sight of in the dazzle of Italian sunlight. We 
came to Italy to look upon ancient memorials, to 
rejoice in her beauty of landscape and of climate. 
In short, we came to search, not for Italy but 
for certain special things which we knew Italy 
had to give us. We took these, and too often 
imagined that these were all her gifts. The re- 
cords of her storied centuries, the achievements 
of her long artistic prime, the sunshine of certain 
favoured spots, the charm of a friendly and pol- 
ished people — these called the world to study 
and to recreation. There was so much in Italy 
— small wonder that most of us saw only a por- 
tion, the portion that seemed specially hers. 

The past and the arts : these were Italy's, 
by obvious right. The world agreed, but the 
world did not see the fresh growth springing from 
Italy's eternally fertile soil. The world saw the 
hundreds of singers, and was blind to the mil- 
lions of workers. So much so that you cannot 
blame the angry iconoclast youth of Italy which 



- 88 - 

cursed her museums and called her to break away 
from the traditions which, men said, were all 
that she had. Some of these defiant champions 
of the New Italy would shut up or sell the paint- 
ings and the sculptures, the churches and the pa- 
laces, and hush the singing voices. So Italy would 
be free from her legendary attributes, and would be 
seen for what she is. They are wrong, of course — 
these extremists. The Italy which they would force 
upon the world is no more the real Italy than is 
the image they would destroy. The heritage which 
they would cast aside is the real basis of Italy's pro- 
gress, but they have been driven to their extreme 
position by the attitude of other nations, which 
finally brought the despairing conviction that Italy's 
past prevented a just appreciation of Italy's present, 
and prejudiced her hopes for the future. 

Such a conclusion is the fruit of exaspera- 
tion, but the exasperation is natural. Too many 
of those who came to Italy paid no regard to 
the progress made by the young kingdom, except 
in so far as that progress diminished the attractions 
of the holiday playground. People shook their 
heads over the disappearance of this or that pictu- 
resque slum, and complained that prices were 
going up. There was increased comfort, of course, 
if you stopped to think of that. There was al- 
ways the beauty of colour and outline, and the 



~ 89 — 

churches and the galleries, and the museums. 
And charming light tenor voices still rang through 
the streets or across the water. For the tourist 
Italy was still Italy, in spite of change. 

And all the while, beneath the effervescence 
that held the eye of the casual beholder, a peo- 
ple was striving, a nation was consolidating. 
There is a widely current belief that the Italian 
is incapable of hard work, a belief that is based, 
no doubt, upon a hasty generalization from an 
experience of the beggars of Naples or the touts 
of tourist Rome. Yet there are few harder toil- 
ers in the world than the Italian peasant, and 
of late years Italians have done much of the 
rough navvy work in Western Europe and Amer- 
ica. They build the railways and the roads, 
the bridges, the dams and the power-stations. 
They work hard and fare hard all the world 
over. Italian labour made the State of Sao Paulo 
in Brazil. Italian labour is the best in all the 
mixed population of Argentina. The Italian navvy 
is the most satisfactory in the United States. 
Before the war almost all the rough manual work 
of Switzerland, except for agriculture, was done 
by Italians, and Italian labour was sought for in 
France, Germany and Austria. Italians were 
doing their full share, and perhaps more than 
their share, in the hard work of the world, and 



— 90 — 

yet the old legend persisted of a lazy, go-as-you- 
please Italy, that worked with one hand only 
while the other held a mandoline or a guitar. 

No doubt the misunderstanding arises partly 
from the latent conviction that the two things 
— - work and song — cannot flourish side by side. 
In England at least we are still suspicious of the 
arts. But the main reason lies in the failure to 
realize the astonishing progress made by Italy in 
the last half- century, and especially in the last 
twenty years. Fifty years ago the legend was 
still largely true. Italy was backward, in terms of 
what we call civilization. General conditions 
were very bad. There was great misery and in 
some districts great disorder. Most of the coun- 
try had but recently been freed from intolerable 
misgovernment — alien or clerical. Poverty and 
oppression had weighed heavily upon the land, 
crushing effort, seeking in vain to stifle thought. 
Only the arts had freedom. 

In the days before the unity of Italy general 
well-being, general material progress, were impos- 
sible. In the days that immediately followed, 
progress was necessarily slow. There was so 
much to be done, so little money to do it with, 
and above all there was the handicap of long 
disunion and long misgovernment, with its legacies 
of suspicion and of the sense that labour was vain. 



91 



Not fifty years have gone past since the 
troops of United Italy entered Rome. Not 
twenty-five have elapsed since the finances of the 
Kingdom were put on a stable footing, and 
Italians began to devote themselves seriously to 
industrial enterprise. The progress made in these 
years is astonishing, to all who have the eyes to 
see and the will to understand. Nor is it only 
material progress that is evident. The easing of 
material circumstances, the widening of opportunity, 
the grow^th of confidence, have given a chance 
for development that is not only material. The 
country grows in every way, as the keen Latin 
intelligence finds fuller scope, and the generous 
Latin heart no more need live shut in upon itself. 
Here was the greatest curse of foreign dominion : 
not the material oppression, but the moral bondage 
that denied freedom both to heart and brain, 
that bred suspicion and choked fine impulse. 

Italy is not yet altogether free from the effects 
of that bondage, and of the long divisions between 
the Italian peoples. How could she be, after 
less than fifty years ? The worst legacy is the 
lack of confidence, the individual's mistrust both 
of himself and of his neighbour, which still 
handicaps the development of Italy, which checks 
effort and co-operation. The Italian is not yet 
quite sure of himself, even when he says that he 



— 91 — 

is. And the habit bred of long misrule still 
warns him to be slow in trusting his neighbour. 

It is all so natural, if we will only remember 
that though the history of Italy goes back to 
the beginnings of European civilization this new 
re-flowering of the race is very recent. Here is 
the great contradiction that explains, if anything 
can, the Italians of today. An old race, a young 
kingdom — Italy of today is the heir of a 
unique ancestry, but she has not yet come to 
full stature. They wrong her future who claim 
that she is already full-grown. 

Modern Italy is still in the making, but the 
splendid material is ready to hand. Italy may 
find it hard to win great riches, owing to lack 
of coal and a scant supply of metals. But 
water-power may largely take the place of coal, 
and there are untapped metal resources which 
will lessen the Italian dependence upon imports. 
A large prosperity will certainly come. But it 
is the human material that will chiefly count in 
the making of the country ; here lies the greatest 
contribution to the world. 

It is an indestructible breed that springs from 
Italian soil, a breed that persists triumphant 
through prosperity and devastation. Twice it has 
gone down in ruin before the German barbarism 
and twice it has risen and come to its own 




Victor Emanuel Orlando 

The Italian Premier. 

(1917-1918). 



^ ^ 




General Armando Diaz 

Commander in Chief of the Italian Army 



— 93 - 

again. It is " the Third Italy " that is fighting 
today the fight which Rome fought and that 
Second Italy of the Renaissance, the fight for 
civilization against Germanism. Rome went down 
at the last, and when Rome fell the whole 
Western World was plunged in darkness. The 
Second Italy succumbed to the pressure of that 
German organization which was known as the 
Holy Roman Empire, but before the Second 
Italy fell others had lit their torches at the flame 
of civilization which she had re-kindled. And 
her own light never went out, though freedom 
was eclipsed by division and oppression. Even 
in her periods of " decay " Italy gave richly to 
the world, in science, in art, in literature. 

Then came the great upspringing. The Italy 
that was a mere " geographical expression " 
brought forth three giant figures, a statesman, a 
thinker and dreamer, a leader of men — Cavour, 
Mazzini, Garibaldi — three authentic giants 
whose reputation still grows with the passage of 
lime. These were great men, symbols of true 
greatness in the race, and there have been great 
Italians since. But it is always misleading to 
judge a country by its great figures, and it is 
perhaps specially misleading in the case of Italy. 
To understand Italy you must know the people. 

To begin with, the " people " of Italy is not 



— 94 — 

less diversified than the people of the United 
Kingdom. The stock is as mixed, though it has 
been longer in the blending, and political union 
is very recent. It is as difficult to find a "ty- 
pical Italian " as a " typical Briton ", though in 
both cases people are very ready to write out 
the label and affix it. There are all kinds : two 
anecdotes from the war zone are proof enough. At 
the one extreme there is the canny Alpino reservist, 
who at the end of a day's stiff fighting in the 
mountains had expended only 37 cartridges. He 
explained that he never fired unless he was certain 
of hitting. As a taxpayer he objected to waste 
of ammunition. At the other extreme you might 
place the light-hearted Neapolitan Bersagliere, 
who dragged an unexploded shell back to his 
trench, and when he was stormed at for his folly 
and told to leave his prize in case it should burst, 
made the placid reply : " We've given it such a 
shaking that if it hasn't burst already it isn't 
likely to now ''. 

Generalization is difficult when the national 
label includes types so well defined and dif- 
ferentiated as the Piedmontese and the Neapolitan, 
the Venetian and the Sicilian, the Tuscan and 
the Calabrian, and the Roman who holds himself 
apart from and above all the rest. The North, 
which is well advanced upon the path of material 



- 95 — 

prosperity, proclaims its superiority over the more 
backward South and often shows impatience with 
eternal Rome herself. Rome is unmoved, for 
Rome is Rome (you might find a parallel in the 
case of Lancashire and London), but the South 
retorts upon the North, and with justice, that it 
has had far more leeway to make up, and that 
it has been neglected by successive governments. 
They hardly know one another as yet — the 
North and the South. It is not long since they 
recognized they both belonged to Italy. And a 
poignant reminder of the newness of Italy's freedom 
and unity is given by the simple exclamation of 
a soldier to whom the King had talked on one 
of his numberless visits to the advanced lines : 
" Why, the King is an Italian like ourselves ! " 
The war is cementing Italy into a real whole. 
When peace comes it may be hoped that " loc- 
alism " will have grown to a wiser patriotism, for 
the essential differences are certainly no greater 
than between Englishman and Scot. When Ro- 
mans and Sardinians, Genoeses and Tuscans, Lom- 
bards and Sicilians, have fought and suffered 
together, when each has seen how the other lives 
and jokes and sings, and how he dies, real 
understanding is born, and Italy's sons are true 
brothers at last. There was an old story that 
the Southerners were poor soldiers. No doubt 



— 96 - 

they were when they fought for the Bourbons. 
The Italian is too intelligent to make good 
" cannon-fodder " in the service of an alien despot. 
To day the troops of the South are certainly not 
less efficient than those of the North ; some would 
even give them the palm. And this although 
they are not spurred on by traditional hatred of 
the Austrian ; for they never knew the Austrian 
oppressor. Southern troops have done wonderful 
things in the war, because they understand what 
they are fighting for. They know that they are 
fighting for Italy, but they know more than that. 
The instinct and the intelligence that are their 
heritage have made them understand something 
of the nature of the world-struggle. 

Intelligence — that is one common factor that 
runs from north to south, though Italy too has 
her Boeotia and her Auvergne. Taken all round 
there is no race that can compare with the Ita- 
lian for true intelligence, not mere sharpness. It 
comes, I suppose, from two thousand years of 
civilization, experienced by a gifted complex of 
races. It has little to do with knowledge, for 
Italy's system of education is still very deficient: 
a great part of her population is unlettered, and 
would be described as ignorant. They are igno- 
rant, according to some standards, but they have 
minds. A lightning quickness to grasp new things, 



- 97 — 

a power of thinking and of reasoning, an interest 
in the world — these are qualities that you find 
far down the scale of society. The natural 
mental gifts of all classes are such that Italy, of 
all the European countries, seems to furnish the 
best material for a true democracy. And the 
Italian has the natural gift of manners. His is 
the politeness of the naturally " gentle ", that ne- 
ver approaches servility. 

There are many people, both Italians and 
foreigners, who say of the Italian lov/er classes 
that they are like children. It is half a truth. 
They are like children in their impressionability, in 
their easy content, their ready laughter, their quick 
anger. They are like children in the disconcert- 
ing accuracy of their instinctive judgments. They 
are like children because they are untaught, and 
because they are unbent to discipline. They are 
like children, too, in that contradictory mixture 
of extreme frankness and extreme reserve. And 
most of all they are like children because of their 
unspoiled eagerness and the small sum of their 
needs. Yet the comparison is only half true, be- 
cause even the ignorant Italian seems to have a 
philosophy which saves him from the bitter griefs 
and resentments of childhood. He seldom cries 
for the moon, and though there are in him im- 
pulses and strivings which may carry him far, he 



— 98 — 

is, generally at least, essentially reasonable. It 
has been said above that he lacks the sense of 
discipline. In a manner that is true. The Ita- 
lian is intolerant of certain interferences which 
are a part of social discipline. He is remarkably 
careless of regulations, though part of his care- 
lessness is due to a knowledge that a charitable 
authority is not always rigidly insistent upon the 
enforcement of its rulings. Yet the place of or- 
ganized discipline is largely supplied by an asto- 
nishing patience, a philosophic and dignified good 
humour under the trials of life. 

Perhaps, until recently, there has been too 
little of the " divine discontent " that leads to 
progress — too much acquiescence, too easy a 
philosophy. But it is only recently that oppor- 
tunity has been given, and the Italian people is 
waking to it. The new generation was certain 
to bring changes, and the war will have hastened 
their coming. 

For one thing, the war will have brought 
confidence. Practically no Italian would have 
believed that Italy could stand the test which 
she has stood and is standing. They did not 
know the strength and valour of their own people. 
Now they understand, and Italy's allies must un- 
derstand. The strain upon Italy has been very 
heavy, and she has answered nobly. There have 



- 99 - 

been greater privations in Italy than in any other 
of the Entente countries, and the " undisciplined " 
Italian people, even more individualist than the 
British, has suffered in touching patience. It has 
suffered cruel hardship and it has suffered grie- 
vous loss. 

" They will never stand the casualties " — 
this was the fear that lay at the hearts of many 
leading Italians. Family affection is a notable 
feature of Italian life, and there was keen anxiety 
as to the effect of the losses upon the popula- 
tion. The losses have been far beyond any expect- 
ation. Of the men who have been called to the 
colours one-sixth have lost their lives or been 
dismissed from the Army as permanently unfit (1). 
The Italian government has never permitted a de- 
tailed statement of casualties, and as a result the 
sacrifices made have been strangely underestimated 
by Italy's allies. It may be hoped that the rough 
figure given here will help to bring home the 
truth. 

The country has borne its burden of grief 
and suffering unflinchingly, and the Italian soldier 
has stood punishment as well as those of any 
army — the dreadful punishment of modern war 



(1) This figure does not include the heavy losses 
of the last triumphant offensive. 



— 100 — 

which has never been approached before. Often, 
through lack of skill, the losses have been 
heavier than they need have been. Always 
they have been increased beyond the inevitable 
figure by a shortage in guns and shells. Italy's 
soldiers have been very hardly tried, and they 
have given a magnificent response. The answer 
of the country has been no less splendid. Italy 
knows now that she may trust Italians. Faith is 
growing- The future is sure. 



CARTINA 

della 




Map of the fourth Italian war of independence. 



^m^^m^^^^mrm^wm 



POSTSCRIPT 




I HESE chapters were passing through 
""'^^ the press when the resistance of the 
^L enemy nations crumbled, with such 
startling suddenness at the last. It follows that cer- 
tain passages became out of date, but the broad 
lines of argument are not affected, save perhaps 
in one instance. Once more, and finally, by the 
last battle in the mountains and beyond the 
Piave, victory has crowned Italian effort. Italy's 
services to the common cause should be more 
apparent now. 

Yet even at the moment of success the ten- 
dency to underestimate Italian achievements re- 
mained alive. This continued failure to appreciate 
the part played by Italy was due to a complex of 
causes. In the first place, during the two months 
previous to the final blow there had been much 
criticism directed against the Italian High Com- 
mand for its delay in striking. The British and 
French forces in France v/ere hammering relent- 



— 102 - 

lessiy at the German armies ; a sudden thrust 
finished Bulgaria ; the Turks were being brought 
to their knees, thanks to the irresistible advance 
of the British forces in Palestine and Mesopo- 
tamia. Only the Italian front remained inactive, 
save for some successful local operations in Sep- 
tember. !n England and France it w^as asked : 
^^ What is the Italian Army doing ? " and the 
question was put even more urgently in Italy. 
The successful Italian advance in Albania and the 
break-up of General Pflanzer Baltin's army did 
not seem a sufficient answer. And it was not suf- 
ficient, especially for Italians. The question was 
far more important for Italy than for her Allies. 
For Italy keenly desired to play her full part in 
the victory that now at last seemed surely pro- 
mised. 

An Italian offensive had been foreshadowed 
for the first half of September, but General Diaz 
did not consider it wise to move so soon. His 
decision gave rise to criticism, but if the facts are 
fairly faced it will surely be difficult to maintain 
the critical attitude. The enemy were superior 
in numbers, and greatly superior in artillery, and 
they had an immense advantage in positions. 
Ten Austro- Hungarian divisions had been moved 
to other fronts since the Italian victory in June, 
but 63 divisions still lay between the Stelvio and 



— 103 — 

the sea. Facing these were 51 Italian divisions, 
three British, two French, a Czecho-Slovak Legion 
and an American regiment. And the reserves 
were aheady nearly exhausted. It is clear that 
an offensive was risky. A failure to achieve a 
big success might have reinforced for a time the 
internal situation in Austria- Hungary, which was 
quickly going from bad to worse, and to ensure 
a big success a clean break through was necessary. 
General Diaz asked for a large contingent of 
American troops so that he might have adequate 
reserves, but his arguments were not considered 
to justify the removal of these troops from France, 
where the principal struggle was being fought out. 
In the end General Diaz decided to attack 
with the forces he had on the spot and stake 
all upon this single effort. His decision was taken 
late in September. Events had marched quickly 
during the previous month, and it was calculated 
that the enemy's power of resistance was wea- 
kening. From the purely military point of view 
there still seemed grave risk in attacking, but the 
chances of success were undoubtedly greater. 
General Diaz took his decision and laid his plans, 
and events showed that the moment was rightly 
chosen. The attacking forces had the handicap 
Oi very unfavourable weather. The mountains 
were shrouded in mist and channels of the Piave 



— 104 — 

were filled with roaring flood water. There was 
heavy and uncertain fighting for several days, 
ana there were many anxious moments. But the 
will to vicLcry was with the attackers. The 
enemy Fifth and Sixth Armies were separated 
by a magnificent thrust. The breach was rapidly 
widened, and, when the front was pierced and 
one of the main lines of communication was thre- 
atened, the enemy resistance crumbled. The Italian 
plan was brilliant in idea, and it was splendidly 
executed, in spite of the delay caused by the 
flooded river. !n one of the critical sectors two 
British divisions, which were included in a mixed 
Italian and British Army entrusted by General 
Diaz to the command of Lord Cavan, played a 
very conspicuous part, and the French contingent 
was equally worthy of the national reputation. 
Perhaps the heaviest fighting of all fell to the lot 
of the Italian Fourth Arm.y in the mountain sector 
between the Piave and the Brenta, whose duty it 
was to deceive the enemy into thinking that the 
attack in this sector was the principal move. The 
centre point of the whole scheme was the action 
of the Italian Eighth Army under General Caviglia, 
and its task was finely accomplished in spite of 
great difficulties. But where all did so well, it 
would be invidious to select any particular troops 
for praise. 



— 105 — 

in England, owing to the meagreness of the 
official communiques and the way in which the 
battle developed, the skiifulness of the plan and. 
the magnitude of the operations were not at first 
understood. Some commen?:s went very far astray, 
and there was a tendency to believe that the 
enemy made little resistance. Until his front vvas 
broken, by the skill of the battle-plan and the 
splendid fighting of the attacking troops, his de- 
fence was stubborn enough, as the tale of losses 
v/ili show. But he was outmanoeuvred and out- 
fought, and in the end his courage gave way. 
Resistance changed rapidly to retreat, and retreat 
to rout and surrender. The Austrian Army 
ceased to exist. A few hours before the armi- 
stice came into force General Diaz was able to 
announce the capture of 300,000 prisoners and 
5000 guns. The total number of prisoners 
exceeded 700,000 and remnants of the Austrian 
army streamed north and east in complete disorder, 
leaving the remainder of its guns behind. 

A year after the Caporetto disaster Italy in- 
flicted upon her traditional enemy a smashing 
defeat which led to the complete break-up of the 
tottering Habsburg Monarchy. In the words of 
a comment published at the time, she ■' has by 
her own courage and her own strength finally 
beaten back the secular danger from across the 



— 106 — 

Alps. She is mistress at last in her own house, 
and she has the proucl gratification of feeling that 
she has achieved her complete liberation after a 
moral recovery from crushing disaster that is 
scarce paralleled in history ". This was the great 
achievement that proves the Italian nation in the 
sight of all the world — the refusal to own defeat, 
the stubborn resolve that led first to successful 
resistance, and at the last to victory, decisive and 
complete. 



m:^^[M^^M:^KW M 'm 



NOTE 




HE official statement of Italy's losses 
during the war fully confirms the in- 
dications given in the preceding pages. 
The number of Italian dead is 467, 934, or 
precisely 1. 3 per cent of the estimated population 
of Italy in 1915. This percentage is practically 
identical with the proportion which the British 
total of dead (including the casualties at sea, 
but making a conservative deduction for deaths 
among Indian and other coloured troops) bears to 
the white population of the British Empire. And 
Italy's losses were suffered in a shorter period 
than ours, by nine months. None may now question 
the extent of her sacrifice. 



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